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This thesis assesses the impact of the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) on the defense policy-making process of the Congress
It provides historical "background on the compelling influences
underlying legislative "budget reform and changes in the Con-
gressional defense policy system that suggested a need for a
CBO.
Specifically, it analyzes the manner in which the National
Security and International Affairs Division within the CBO
has contributed to Congressional defense policy-making. Par-
ticular emphasis is given to the effect which the CBO has had
on the defense "budget process itself, and assessment of the
substantive value of its analyses and budget estimates with
respect to their impact on defense policy outcomes.
Extensive review of available archival data and published
reports is complemented by interviews of Congressional committee
staff members who have had a direct experience or working
relationship with the CBO regarding defense issues.
Major conclusions were that l) CBO has made a measurable
policy impact on specific defense issues, and Z) the degree
to which this impact is observed varies among Congressional
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On July 12, 1974 President Nixon signed into law a bill
intended to improve the mechanics of the Federal budget process
(PL 93-34-4), the "Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974. " The creation of the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) as a primary new support agency was one of the major
innovative budget reform measures provided by the act. Congress,
in attempting to correct some of the deficiencies in its budget
process, established the CBO with a mandate of providing Congress
with independent budget and policy analysis information. How-
ever, since its inception in early 1975 » the Congressional
Budget Office has received conflicting assessments regarding
its value to the new Congressional budget process. Moreover,
practically no analysis has been conducted relating to CBO's
impact on the defense budget.
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to assess how the National
Security and International Affairs Division (NSIAD) of the
CBO has affected the Congressional defense decision-making
process. This research will address Congressional use of the
CBO to analyze defense budget options and choices and provide
Congress with an objective assessment of the consequences of
their decisions. In addition, it will evaluate the use of
10

the CBO by committees and Members of Congress as a tool
which leads to more informed decisions.
Specifically, this investigation will answer the following
three basic questions regarding the CBO's role in defense
policy-making.
1. Has the CBO played a significant role in shaping Congres-
sional defense policy debate and key decisions?
2. Has the CBO changed the systematic character of the
Congressional defense policy-making process?
3
.
Is the CBO adequately staffed and equipped to carry out
its mandate of independent policy analysis relative to the
defense issue-area?
Correspondingly, this analysis will attempt to confirm
several propositions regarding the role, interrelations, con-
tributions, and influence of the National Security and Inter-
national Affairs Division - and inferentially , therefore, the
CBO - as an analytical backstop/resource in shaping the
Congressional defense policy process
.
C. SUMMARY OF THESIS CHAPTERS
This thesis ' organizational structure is centered around
the three questions presented above. By way of introduction
to the study, therefore, it seems appropriate to provide a
synopsis of the scope of each succeeding chapter in relation
to these questions.
Chapter Two, entitled "Congress Needed an 0MB , " provides
a historical description of the repeated attempts and impetus
11

for Congressional budget reform and the resultant creation
of the Congressional Budget Office, as an integrating mechanism
in the new "budget process established by the 1974 Budget Reform
Act. It then defines the Congressional defense policy-making
system - based on a review of previous research conducted by
Laurance (1976) and Haass (1979) - and relates the systematic
characteristics of this system to the need and implications for
CBO involvement in the formulation of defense policy. Thus
it suggests the usefulness of the CBO in certain areas of the
defense policy process for the Congress and its committees.
The aim of Chapter Three, which is entitled "Congressional
Budget Office: A New 'Watchdog' Of Congress," is to describe
the statutory role and responsibilities conferred upon the
CBO by the 1974 legislation. By way of demonstrating the
distinctive character of this role, and thereby show the
operational boundaries defining CBO's potential for policy
impact, a comparison is made between CBO and 0MB (Office of
Management and Budget) in terms of the different nature of
their jobs vis-a-vis the budget process. In addition, a des-
cription of CBO's organization and staffing structure is
presented as a basis for understanding subsequent evaluation
of its organizational effectiveness.
Chapter Four is entitled, "Realized/Unrealized Expectations;
Conflicting Views on CBO's Performance," and presents diverse
assessments by its own staff, by other parts of the Congress,
particularly committee staff members , and by outside observers
,
of CBO 's performance and effectiveness in the early years of
12

its existence. It tests the hypothesis that these differences
regarding CBO's effectiveness, are a function of differences
in viewpoint regarding CBO's appropriate role and external
relationships
.
Chapter Five, entitled "National Security and International.
Affairs Division," attempts to: first, assess the utility of
the CBO in providing Congress with adequate information and
analysis - independent of executive sources - both to facilitate
full accomplishment of its functions and strengthen Congress-
sional policy influence, second, measure the extent to which
Congress avails itself of this assistance, specifically in its
defense policy-making effort, and third, defend the proposition,
among others presented, that Congressional participation in
defense policy-making no longer has the characteristic of res-
ponding mainly to executive initiated proposals and/or choosing
among given alternatives. These three aims are explored, using
a series of propositions describing the system that defines
the process model for CBO~Congressional interaction.
To provide evidence confirming these propositions, empirical
indicators are presented based on analysis of data relating
to the National Security Division's development, its defense
analysis activities, and the response given to its reports
and special studies by Congressional consumers . A second and
more difficult objective will be to achieve some progress
toward testing the hypotheses that: (1) CBO's analyses have
substantially influenced the Congressional decision-making
process regarding defense policy issues, and (2) CBO has had




Finally, Chapter Six provides a summary of principal
findings and conclusions resulting from the foregoing analysis.
In addition, it presents recommendations regarding further
research associated with this topic.
D. CONCEPTUAL APPARATUS/RESEARCH TECHNIQUES
The conceptual framework of this analysis is a series of
chronological "snapshots" of the CBO's evolution, commencing
with the years prior to the CBO's establishment (i.e., impetus
for reform), and progressing through its early developmental
stages (1975-1976), culminating with an examination of its
performance in the last five years (1977-1981). Research
techniques for this study involve primarily archival review
of related literature, complemented by interviews of various
CBO staff and Congressional committee/staff members. The
latter process will allow this writer to capture the most
recent appraisal or opinions of those who perhaps are most
intimately involved or have some unique insight as to the inter-
relationships and interaction that currently exists between
the CBO and its clients. This will also serve to bring up to
date previous analyses of conflicting perceptions by observers
within the CBO, Congress, and outsiders, of CBO's utility
in the several years immediately following its creation.
14

II. CONGRESS NEEDED AN OMB
A. HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE CREATION OF A CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE
Congress derives broad legislative authority from its
inherited constitutional mandates and formal powers , which can
be characterized into three distinct functional areas of res-
ponsibility. The Congress creates and administratively manages
the executive departments and agencies , formulates and enacts
the laws of the nation, and controls the budgetary purse strings.
Ippolito succinctly emphasizes the overriding importance of the
power of the purse as the basis of Congressional authority,
(quoting Fenno , 1966:xiii), "underpinning all other legislative
decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the
legislative and executive branches of government." [_ Ref. 1_J
Congressional power of the purse, that is, the authority
to raise revenues and expend public monies, has perhaps been
the most pronounced controversial issue and prominently visible
conflict between the Presidency and the Congress. The growing
powers of the presidency vis-a-vis the budgetary process was
the cause of mounting discord and reaction to what seemed
to be an overruling of Congressional prerogatives. This per-
ception of an increasingly disproportionate balance of
executive-congressional budgetary influence resulted in Congress*
initiation of several formal attempts at budget reform and con-
trol since the early 1920s.
15

Hence, the first part of this chapter is devoted to pro-
viding a brief overview of Congress' systematic attempts to
deal more effectively with the problems, deficiencies, and
conflicts it encounters in executing its managing role in the
Federal budget process. This historical transition or per-
spective is primarily helpful in facilitating an understanding
of the underlying need for the creation of a Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) to assist in strengthening the Congres-
sional budgetary decision process. The second part of this
chapter is concerned specifically with establishing the fundamen-
tal basis and rationale for CBO's involvement and inherent utility
in providing a rational/analytical framework for Congressional
policy debate in making defense resource allocation decisions.
This latter section, then basically reviews previous research
and analysis of the Congressional role in national defense
decision-making, and examines and discusses areas in which
CBO can be a potentially powerful tool in shaping Congressional
information processing and appraisal of policy options regarding
defense issues.
The ensuing tracing of Congressional budget reform history
will focus primarily on four central themes or topics which
generally illuminate and form the basis for a precipitated
Congressional concern over the need to change its role in
the Federal budget process. These are presented below and
are not necessarily in any particular order of significance.
1. Congressional dependence on the Executive Branch for
budget-related information, advice, and recommendations on
16

matters encompassing federal economic policy and the broad
range of government activities and programs. Congress, in
effect, was incapable of coherently challenging presidential
fiscal policy and spending preferences through independent
analysis of policy alternatives.
2. A perceived disparity, on the part of Congress, between
executive-congressional budgetary influence and a gradual
erosion of Congressional control (power) in favor of
presidential dominance over Budget matters. This eventually
led to an intense and protracted confrontation involving
battles between Congress and the President over budget
decisions regarding conflicting policy and program preferences
and trade-offs. This persistent tension and acrimony cul-
minated in the Nixon Administration amid a heated controversy
over Nixon's proclivity for impoundment action, pocket vetoes
and the like, with the passage of the perhaps most assertive
and exhaustive attempt at budget reform - the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 197^ > as a restorative
measure to regain control over the federal budget.
3- Deficiencies inherent within Congress' internal budget
processes and organization. Prominent among a list of
criticisms and/or problems of the congressional budget pro-
cess is Congress' inability or unwillingness to deal with
the federal budget as a comprehensive whole (i.e., consolidated
1Congress essentially acceded in an acquiescent manner
to transferring a major portion of its control to the




package), instead of a fragmentary set of individual appro-
priations requests with no concerted view toward the broad
economic consequences of such uncoordinated actions.
4. The inability of Congress to adequately address the
fiscal, economic, budgetary, and programmatic policy implica-
tions of alternative courses of action regarding budget
decisions for allocation of limited national resources among
competing needs (defense policy-making included). This stems
basically from the lack of an analytic capability or institu-
tional mechanism, akin to that of the Office of Management
and Budget (0MB), through which it could weigh the priorities
for national resource allocation and explicitly address issues
of fiscal policy.
Within the context of the four central themes mentioned
above, Congress has made s-everal attempts to strengthen their
influence over the budget process and effectiveness in national
policy making. During the latter part of the nineteenth century,
the Federal budget process had gradually deteriorated due
principally to: "(l) the splintering of fiscal power in the
Congress, (2) administrative attempts to circumvent congres-
sional control, and (3) "chronic" surpluses created by tariff
revenues." /~~Ref. 2_/
Beginning with and remaining subsequent to the period
1877 to 1885 (Post Civil War), Congress had instituted procedural
changes in the budgetary process calling for a separation of
jurisdiction over spending versus revenue legislation between
18

Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate, and legis-
lative (or authorizing) committees of both chambers.
While this essentially gave legislative committees more
authority and autonomy over programs within their jurisdiction,
it inevitably led to a diffusion of responsibility over fiscal
policy. "Thus no one unit had authority to examine expendi-
tures and receipts and to try to bring the two into balance."
Z"Ref. 3_7
As the federal budget continued to grow to enormous sizes,
the fiscal shortcomings associated with this fragmented view of
spending also displayed a worrisome trend. As late as 197^,
Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr. , described the chaotic congressional
budget process: "Congress never decides how much total
expenditures should be, nor does it go on record as to whether
the budget should have a surplus or a deficit. The total seems
to just happen, without anyone being responsible for it, or know-
ing with much confidence what it will be." / Ref. Ur_J
Meredith /_ Ref. 5j> also espouses this view of fragmented
congressional authority, pointing to the "seemingly disjointed
approach of Congress to its tasks."
Although unconstrained spending by Congress was under
attack by the Presidency, the executive branch was not without
fault in its relations with the treasury. Pfiffner
/~Ref
.
2: p. 12_7" attributes the executive tactic of coercive
2
"Both the Senate and the House of Representatives are
divided into more than twenty committees apiece, to
which members are assigned by their respective parties
in numbers reflecting the overall balance between the
parties in Congress." /Ref. 6: p. 1^9_J
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deficiencies - along with the traditional transferring of
funds. He cites Wilmerding, 194-3 : "Agencies would spend
their funds for the year and threaten Congress with the
cessation of essential services if additional funds were not
provided.
"
Pfiffner £~Ref . ^J relates the apparent irony, to the
twentieth century observer of current fiscal policy, of the
third causal factor of the "budgetary malaise of the late 1800s:
"chronic" budget surpluses. The main source of federal revenue
was the protective customs tariff, of which a large trade volume
insured a constant supply of funds for government spending.
The absence of an internal income tax offered no political
deterrent to effectively apply pressure on both Congress and
the Executive Branch to strive for economy and efficiency.
Congress could then continue to be lax in its spending policies,
while the Presidency went unchecked in its habitual coercive
deficiencies tactic. Retorts Pfiffner /~Ref . 2: p. Y}J\
"But the habits formed during the years of surplus continued
after the surpluses disappeared and contributed to the demands
for an executive budget and more discipline in federal
spending .
As a result, the Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency
was created by Congress in 1910 to examine the national budget
system with emphasis toward reform. The Taft Commission
released its report two years hence, recommending a revamping
of the executive financial process in terms of a centralized,
national budget system under presidential direction. The
20

commission felt that a consolidated budget system with presi-
dential oversight would provide for a more coherent considera-
tion of spending and revenue issues. Moreover, the president
would submit his budget plan to Congress for its action,
with functional categorization of budget items making choices
among policy priorities more obvious. Pfiffner /"~Ref. 2: p. 13_7
further relays the commission's argument for recommending that
Congress restrict its realm of legislative purview to deciding
policy issues, while allowing the president the prerogative
to direct actual implementation of federal policy. The com-
mission's rationale was, in effect, that its proposed plan
constituted a rational foundation for promoting mutual coopera-
tion between the legislature and the executive for shaping and
executing national policy.
In the aftermath of the extreme economic and financial
pressures brought about by World War I, Congress finally
succumbed and passed a compromised version of the Good bill
£~Ref. 2: p. 15_7» establishing the 1921 Budget and Accounting
Act. In doing so, Congress was naively imperceptive of the
imperiling nature of its decision, as it would much later
realize. At issue was Congress' waning power over policy
matters relative to an increasingly imperious presidency. That
which, as appallingly witnessed during the Nixon Administration,
would resort oftentimes to spurious, shrewd, and whimsical
challenges of Congressional program and policy preferences.
Hence, the essential beginnings of the "imperial presidency."
Haass Z~Ref
. 6_/, and Schlesinger /~R ef . 7_7, relate the
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emergence of an imperial presidency, with dominance over policy
and program initiatives, to Congress' failure to face up to
its constitutional and political responsibilities. Ippolito
/"Ref . 1_/, Pfiffner /T^ef . Zj, and Wildavsky /~Ref . 8_7
reflect similar viewpoints.- Congress relied on the president
to impose budgetary restraint and discipline, and the 1921
Budget Act provided him with the requisite tools. What this
act really did was to pave the way for mounting presidential
discretion and dominance over budget policies and prerogratives
for future decades.
As shall be discussed in a later chapter, the act also created
the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) - later changed to the Office
of Management and Budget (0MB) by the 1970 Legislative Reor-
ganization Act - which was to play a significant part (vis-a-vis
the process of central legislative clearance), in the perceived
relative imbalance of budgeting powers between Congress and
the president. Pfiffner /~Ref . 9J concedes that the accretion
of presidential dominance over national policy matters is
related to the "development of the institution of legislative
clearance, that is, the necessity to clear legislative proposals
from the Executive Branch with the Budget Bureau before they
can be sent to Congress." A parallel and equally overwhelming
source of advantage over Congress, in terms of using the budget
to promote policy initiatives and leadership, was the Budget
Bureau's (now 0MB' s) inherent capability to gather and process
budget information and analyze alternative policy choices.
The Bureau could make specific program recommendations and
implement these choices (executive preferences and priorities),
22

within its mandate of integrating a federal (omnibus) budget
and exercising management overview of all federal agencies. Not
surprisingly, President Nixon in 1970 reaffirmed the Bureau's
central position in the budgetary process by reorganizing it
,
"creating the 0MB and giving it the responsibility of imple-
menting and evaluating legislation and policies." /~Ref. 10:
p. 60
J
Another development which marginally strengthened the
president's budget leadership and broadened his scope of
responsibility, was the enactment of the Employment Act of 194-6.
£"Ref . 10^7 Part of this legislation empowered the president
to make policy and budget decisions pursuant to the federal
responsibility for effectively managing the national economy.
The president would be aided by a newly established Council
of Economic Advisors (CEA) in preparing a required annual
economic report for Congress' review. To assist Congress in
its evaluation of presidential recommendations for economy
policy, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) was also created.
Consequently, the 1946 Employment Act "established a federal
government role in economic management and assigned a central
position to the president as what as has been termed the 'Manager
of Prosperity'." /""Ref. 11_7 The Nixon Administration went
so far as to interpret the act as "confering a general dis-
cretion on presidents to modify appropriations measures in
order to control inflation." /~Ref. 2 s p. 57_7
Andrews /~Ref
. 12_7, describes yet another attempt by
Congress at reform, with the passage of the Legislative
23

Reorganization Act of 194-6. He bases the following abbre-
viated account of Congress ' failure to effectively implement
a "legislative budget" in response to a growing deluge of
criticism of the existing Congressional budget process , on
the work performed by Saloma /~Ref . 13_7 S
The House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance
Committee, and the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees were to meet and report a legislative bud-
get to their respective Houses by February 15 • This
budget was to include over-all Federal receipts and
expenditures and to be accompanied by a concurrent
resolution fixing a ceiling on total appropriations.
This legislative budget was never implemented. In
1947 both Houses passed concurrent resolutions which
never got out of committee because of a deadlock on
the distribution of an anticipated surplus. In 1948
a ceiling was set, but was disregarded by the appro-
priations committees and Congress. In 1949 the leg-
islative budget was postponed for three months. In
that time eleven bills had passed in the House and
nine in the Senate. Consequently, no legislative
budget was reported that year, nor has one been reported
since
.
Section 138 of the act, calling for a legislative budget,
remained essentially obscure for the ensuing two decades
until rescinded by the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970 (Section 242). The concept of a legislative budget had
been counterproductive to achieving budget discipline due
to conflict with certain pragmatic realities. /f~Ref . 14:
p. 237J7 Saloma /~Ref . 15_7» Ippolito /~Ref . 16J , Pfiffner
Z~Ref. 17_7> and Fenno /~~Ref . 18_7 advocate similar opinions
of why this reform attempt failed. Saloma 's reasons for
the legislative budget failure are threefold:
"1. The Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget was
not constituted or staffed on a realistic basis.
24

"2. The scheduing of the legislative budget did not
leave adequate time for joint Committee consideration.
"3. Congress was reluctant to commit itself to a legis-
lative "budget prior to detailed consideration of the
separate appropriations requests." /"~Ref. 19_7
Subsequent to the illfated 194-6 reform attempt there
have been numerous other proposals of a restorative nature,
all of which met either with Congressional disapproval or
have turned out to be ineffective. Ippolito /~~Ref . Is p. 98_7,
lists several of these: "The 195° Omnibus Appropriations
Bill, separate budget sessions, expenditure ceilings, and
Joint Budget Committees."
It is useful to interject here a discussion of an ever
persistent irritant which further weakened Congressional con-
trol over the federal budget during the decades following
the 194-6 legislative reform failure - "backdoor spending."
The subject of internal strife between the authorizing
committees and Appropriations Committees, backdoor spending
is a prime example of the problems associated with Congress'
institutional fragmentation of authority over budget matters.
As defined by Pfiffner /~Ref . 2: p. Ik-lJ, backdoor spending
is "legislation that creates budget authority but originates
in a legislative rather than appropriations committee."
An example is the House Ways and Means and other committees
that effect spending through tax legislation (i.e., tax
expenditures), or direct drafts on the Treasury. Ippolito
25

/~Ref. 1: p. 95_7'» describes the earliest examples of
"backdoor spending, involving contract authorization and loan
authority. Briefly, the first had to do with authorizing
committees creating statutory authority for agencies or
departments to enter into contracts or obligations with-
out specific appropriation approval. The award of a con-
tract or incurrence of an obligation in effect necessitated
funds subsequently being appropriated without much Congres-
sional discretion over such provision. Loan authority em-
powered certain agencies to circumvent the appropriations
process by borrowing funds directly from the Treasury.
Hence, a perceived and efficaciously outright dominance of
the authorizing committees versus Appropriations Committees
over spending decisions. Fenno /~Ref . 18: pp. 98-108_7,
traces the development of backdoor spending techniques.
More recently though, another variant of backdoor
spending has become extremely significant in terms of runaway
or uncontrollable spending. These are "mandatory entitlements,"
which command huge sums of federal monies in the form of
unemployment compensation, social security, welfare payments,
income sharing, and other social insurance programs by
persons or states and local governments who meet the legal
requirements for receipt of payments. In effect, as Ippolito
states, this type of spending is contingent upon eligibility
rules, state of the economy and bureaucratic efficiency
rather than prespecified appropriation authority.




As a result of this growing infringement upon the
appropriations process, Congress set several controls to
curb backdoor spending methods as part of the reform pro-
visions of the 197^ Budget Act. Although as Ippolito stresses,
these measures have only stifled, not totally removed, such
encroachments: "In 1975 > for example, approximately $11-5
billion in contract authorizations and $1.5 billion in
loan authority were available without current action by
Congress." /~Ref. 1: p. 95_7
Nonetheless, what is important to note here, and the
focus of the preceding review of the backdoor spending issue,
is the notion of "controllable versus uncontrollable" and
its applications (as shall be pointed out in the latter
section of this chapter) to the systemic characterization
of Congress' defense policy-making process and the intrinsic
nature of the defense issue itself. Mandatory entitlement
programs such as those enumerated above, constitute much
of the 70 percent or so of the federal budget that is
"uncontrollable." On the other hand, the defense budget
is relatively controllable by Congress. An important obser-
vance and distinction to make is the diverse nature of
defense decisions (over strategic, programmatic issues)
versus domestic decisions (over structural, fiscal issues).
Laurance £~Ref
. 20_y7 , explicitly addresses these terms
(strategic vs. structural) in his extensive examination of the
role of Congress in defense policy-making.
27

For example, policy decisions regarding the size and
composition of the U.S. Navy (i.e., force design issues),
MX-Missile basing or strategic/tactical nuclear weaponry,
as opposed to issues surrounding social welfare programs
such as food stamps, and health insurance or agricultural
price support subsidies, are generally under less scrutiny
from the mass public, the media, or even the attentive public
(lobbyists', interest groups, advocates, etc.). What is
relevant here is the nature of defense issues. The char-
acter of the defense issue is portrayed by the terms:
scientific, technical, secretive, and high risk. Again, it
is necessary to differentiate between the dimension or
riskiness as associated with national security and that
which is related to political feasibility. Congress will
habitually leave decisions involving high risk defense
implications to the president, whereas, within the context
of political risk, it is apt to feel more comfortable and
less restrained (i.e., more flexible) to make policy decisions
on most mundane defense issues than it would in deciding,
say, welfare issues.
Put another way, even though legislators would be con-
sciously aware of their representative role of providing con-
stituent service, they will probably exercise less caution in
voting on spending bills affecting defense than they will
regarding welfare or any other domestic concern. The
essence of this different Congressional outlook on defense
legislation is then, the nature of the issue itself which
28

attracts less public interest and involvement (or reaction).
This premise holds true, however, assuming there is no
dramatic increase in the public's perception of the military
threat or growing public criticism of the military- indus-
trial complex. /"Ref. 21 1 pp. 433-434<J
Given the controllable aspect and special nature of
the defense policy-making arena, a proposition is offered here
to the effect that Congress, in the wake of its newly found
budget expertise, should, potentially can, and does now
play a greater hand in defense policy. Moreover, that this
recent emergence of a strengthened role in Congressional
oversight and scrutiny of the defense budget has come about
as a direct consequence of the revamping of its budget-
review machinery. With the passage of the 1974 Congres-
sional Budget Act, Congress created the newest of its sup-
port agencies - the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) -
henceforth, arming itself with the necessary fact-finding
and analytic tools that would enable its independent review
and assessment of policies in a manner in which it could
never have done so before. This thesis purports to demon-
strate that the CBO is a major factor in helping Congress
to participate effectively in the defense policy process
and thereby shape that policy.
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974 (PL 93-344), has been the latest in a string of
attempts at budgetary reform. /~~Ref . 22J Its goals or
purposes are explicitly listed in section 2 of the act,
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however, Aaron Wildavsky "best summarizes its general
purpose in maintaining that the goals of reform of budget-
ing in the U.S. are economy,- efficiency, improvement, or
just "better "budgeting. /~Ref . 8: p. 127_7 The 197^ act
essentially was aimed at putting a halt to unchecked pre-
sidential spending discretion, a complete reversal of
the unilateral "budget power afforded the president in the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Basically then, Con-
gress established a Joint Study Committee on Budget Control
in the fall of 1972 for the primary purpose of suggesting
ways to reassert Congressional spending control and effect
coordination of budget outlays and receipts. /~Ref. 1:
p. 99_7 Ippolito states that "in addition, however, Con-
gress was faced in 1972 with a sharp executive challenge
to its budget authority. When Congress did not agree to
the Nixon administration's request for a $250 billion
ceiling on fiscal 1973 expenditures, the President accel-
erated the use of impoundments to impose the ceiling."
£~Ref. 1: p. 98_7 As such, the primary impetus for the
197^ budget reform came from a serious presidential chal-
lenge to Congressional budgetary prerogatives.
Pfiffner /~Ref. 2: pp. 132-lbb_J , provides a compre-
hensive account of the Joint Study Committee's recommen-
dations for budget reform and the legislative history
of H.R. 7130 which was finally enacted into law.
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Ippolito /~Ref. Is pp. 99-100_7, also gives a detailed
review of six major problems that characterized Congress '
handling of the budget and which were the focus of Congres-
sional attention in its consideration of budget reform
legislation leading up to the 197^ act. These problems
were presented in the beginning of this chapter, in a con-
densed form in terms of four central themes for discussion
of factors affecting Congress ' capacity to make and con-
trol policy.
The remainder of this thesis focuses on the perhaps
most essential and significant procedural and organizational
change enacted under PL 93-344 in response to the fourth
major problem in Ippolito' s list: "4. There was no
staff organization responsible to Congress to provide
fiscal policy and program analysis. Congress was accordingly
too reliant on information and analys.es provided by the
President and the Office of Management and Budget (0MB)."
The response, in effect, was the creation of the Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) as a counterpart to the Execu-
tive Branch's 0MB, with the mandate of providing Congress
with nonpartisan and independent budget estimates, economic
projections, and policy analyses in order to lessen Con-
gressional dependency on Executive Branch data and analyses.
Z~Ref. 2: p. 138^
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The role of the CBO in the successful implementation
of the new Congressional "budget process will "be examined
more closely in chapter three of this paper. First,
however, it is necessary to present a perspective of
growing Congressional influence over the defense budget
process "by viewing how Congress ' role in defense policy-
making has evolved. This is the subject of the following
section.
B. EVOLUTION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET PROCESS
The discussion to this point has concentrated on Con-
gressional budget power in general and has shown how
executive legislative conflict over budget decisions
manifested a need for a CBO. Now we will examine Congres-
sional budget power in a specific policy area - Defense.
The intent is to assess the Congressional defense policy
process to determine the need and implications for CBO
involvement in the formulation of defense policy.
The following description of the evolving role of Con-
gress in the defense policy-making process since the later
194-0 's, stems primarily from Edward J. Laurance's doctoral
research and published articles on this topic. In his
1976 article /~"R e f . 20_/, Laurance takes a systematic look
at the factors, both internal and external to the Congres-
sional institution, that he believes describe and explain
a changing participatory relationship between Congress
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and the Executive Branch in the area of defense policy.
He postulates that significant changes in the role of
Congress in the defense budget process have occurred since
1968 and attempts to substantiate this claim through the
development of certain systemic indicators.
First, he constructs a descriptive model of the actual
decision process which directed the nature of Congressional
participation in national defense policy-making during
the period 1947-1967- In depicting the general process
characteristics of the system, he bases his description
on the review of previous studies done on Congress and
defense prior to 1968. /~Ref. 21: pp. 432-433_7 His
heuristics-based process model evolves around a set of 14
propositions (or assumptions) which he bases almost entirely
on conclusions drawn from these works. Summarily, these
propositions parallel the conventional viewpoints of the
post-1968 literature: "that the Congressional role in
defense policy during the 1948-1968 period was a passive
one of reacting to the information and policy alternatives
put forth by the Defense Department." /~Ref. 21: p. 433^
Laurance proposes a secondary objective of attempting
to test the hypothesis that there exists a temporal dichotomy
in defense policy systems between the periods 1947 to
1967, and 1968 to 1974. The propositions he puts forth
regarding Congressional behavior on defense policy matters
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in effect describe the "behavioral norms defining the 1947-
1967 system. His first set of propositions convey the con-
census of expert opinion regarding the executive primacy
view of Congressional policy oversight. Examples are:
1. "Congress processes structural (or financial) issues
of defense policy, while the executive "branch processes
strategic (or program) issues." Basically, he implies,
Congress necessarily gets more actively involved with
domestic problems relative to foreign problems.
2. "Congress acts as a conduit for the majority of the
defense programs of the executive branch, especially
in comparison with other issue-areas." Here he presents
the notion of the military committees ' habitual "rubber-
stamping" of executive defense program initiatives,
due to their myopic focus on fiscal (i.e., cost/benefit)
imperatives of defense management. /~Ref. 20: pp. 215-2l6_J7
His second set of propositions offer explanations for
the executive dominance syndrome affecting the defense
policy process. Two examples are:
1. "Executive monopoly of intelligence and technology
as it relates to defense policy, insures executive dom-
inance in that Congress only processes alternative programs
generated by the executive branch." Here, Laurance intro-
duces the aurora of impenetrability surrounding the very
nature of the defense issue. That is, as previously
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mentioned, the secrecy, expertise, technological com-
plexities, and high risks associated with defense policy
issues (that remained the purview of the Executive
Branch) , which served to subjugate both public interest
and Congressional scrutiny.
2. "Executive dominance in defense policy-making is
enhanced by general public support for defense programs
in-being or proposed by the executive branch." Here
again, the nature of the defense issue along with favor-
able public opinion (i.e., high perception of external
military threat) , interferes in Congressional capability
to put pressure on or influence executive policy propos-
als. /"Ref. 20: p. 21 7__7_
Finally, his third set of propositions depict the heuris-
tic decision rules that govern the institutional interplay
that occurs, both between Congress and its internal committees
which process defense policy and between Congress and the
Executive Branch/Defense Department. Examples of these are:
1. "The authorization-appropriation process for defense
policy is characterized by a lack of coordination and
direction." Here he refers to the forces of intercommittee
conflict and rivalry, and the decentralized structure of
3
^Laurance qualifies here that it is only the attentive
publics and interest groups that enter the system and
hence affect defense policy formulation, but only
through the Executive Branch.
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Congress that work to preclude a cooperative, coherent,
and consolidated review of the defense budget. This view
is shared by Haass /~Ref. 6: p. 149_J7: "The chief conse-
quence of this structural disunity is to divide the congres-
sional perspective, making the creation of integrated and
coherent legislation and policy almost impossible."
"Compromise becomes the paramount concern: (he quotes
Congressman Aspin) 'Legislative conflicts in Congress are
resolved more often than not by political pressure, not by
any rational presentation of the issues ' .
"
2. "The military committees rely solely on executive wit-
nesses when analyzing defense policy." Here the executive
monopoly on technology and intelligence, coupled with
pro-military committees, combine to obviate the need for
access to outside comments and opinion other than testimony
from executive source witnesses. / Ref . 20: p. 219_7
Next, Laurance proceeds to describe the above system
more accurately and provides circumstantial evidence which
indicates a perceptible systemic change toward a strengthened
Congressional role in defense budgeting in the 1968-1974- period
His methodological framework for analysis centers around a
systemic model of the Congressional defense policy-making
process. He defines this system in terms of four key sub-
systems which delineate Congressional behavior and inter-
action in the defense issue-area. The systematic process
model he develops is configured according to:
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1. Inputs ; These consist of public opinion, lobbies
,
testimony at hearings, and numerous Executive Branch
interactions
.
2. Conversion processes ; Various intermediate processes,
including committee integration (i.e., degree of consensus
achieved regarding both procedural and substantive policy
outputs), committee staffs, floor debate, and committee
report orientation.
3. Outputs ; These are measured in terms of both fiscal
and programmatic adjustments by Congress to the defense
budget, and the emergence of coalitions critical of proposed
weapons systems ' design and numbers
.
4. Feedback ; An example of this, which is somewhat difficult
to monitor, is Congress' ability to alter defense policy by
succinctly warning the Defense Department in advance, of
existing Congressional opposition to some particular
proposal. /~~Ref. 21 : p . 434>_/
The conclusions which Laurance ultimately draws are
justified on the basis of empirical indicators that show
significant evidence of fundamental changes having occurred
to the previously defined policy system (i.e., 194-7-1967).
He summarizes the 1968-1974- system in terms of the following
changes s
"1. The number of issues which functionally bypass the
legislative process is decreased.
2. Budgets are shaped, in part, by legislative and com-
mittee debates on defense policy.
3- Outside witnesses provide non-DOD policy alternatives.
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k. Attentive and mass public pressure to decrease defense
spending increases.
5. The Senate Armed Services Committee increases the
length of its hearings and produces significant internal
dissent. In essence, it becomes the main focal point
in legislative defense policy-making.
6. The House committee roles resist change, remaining
essentially the same as in 1947-1967-
7. The Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
Committee abdicates any policy role it formerly held.
8. The report-to-floor time period remains the same for
appropriations but increases for authorization legisla-
tion - significantly, in the case of the Senate.
9. Floor debate and amendments increase significantly
in the case of Senate authorization legislation."
£~Ref. 20: p. 245J
Laurance concludes his analysis by identifying major
functions which explain the causes of an increased Congres-
sional role in defense policy. These include: "the Vietnam
War, decreased public perception of external threat, a rise
in non-DOD defense policy alternatives % increased control
of military procurement, a balanced Senate Armed Services
Committee, continuing debate on national priorities, and the
rise of a legitimate Congressional bloc critical of defense
policy." /~~Ref. 20: pp. 213, 246-247_7 Finally, he asserts
the implications which key variables such as public percep-
tion of the threat arising from adverse U.S. relations with
the Soviets and the foreign versus domestic spending conflict,
have for evaluating the permanency of this change in Congress '
defense policy system.
Haass /~Ref
. 6J puts forth similar criteria (corroborating
Laurance' s analysis), in his assessment of the qualitative
difference in Congress' involvement vis-a-vis the Executive
38

Branch across a "broad spectrum of issues - including defense
policy. He states, "The resulting reassertion of congressional
involvement in the many dimensions of American security policy
can only "be understood in the context of the break-down
of policy consensus, the erosion of the notion of executive
competence, the shock of widespread illegal activities, and
the impetus each of these developments gave to the growth
of congressional ability independently to create and criticize
policy." /~~Ref. 6s p. 148J7 His examination of the DOD
Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1979 reveals a definite
change in Congressional interaction with the defense budget.
He concludes that, "Initiative remains largely with the
executive, reflecting its greater resources and its sophisti-
cated systems analysis capacity in particular. But although
Congress continues to be largely reactive, it is also more
able and more willing than previously to challenge the
executive on more specific programmes. In addition, and
perhaps of equal importance, is the increase in general over-
sight, even where Congress consents to requests, the requests
themselves are scrutinized more thoroughly than in the past .
"
Z~Ref. 6: p. 160
J
7
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE POLICY-MAKING
SYSTEM FOR A CBO
To what extent does the CBO exert any influence on the
changed Congressional defense policy-making system, as
defined by Laurance and Haass in their research? A proposi-
tion which this paper seeks to support is that Congress does
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constructively use (i.e., is receptive of, requests meaning-
ful studies of) the CBO as an aid-to-policy-making resource.
Another, is that the CBO has significantly altered legisla-
tive reliance on Executive Branch policy direction and program
initiatives. The "basis for this change is implicit in
Congress' adaptation to CBO's independent analyses of alter-
native policy options
.
This integrative relationship is seen as an outgrowth of
the aforementioned step-level changes in the Congressional
defense policy system as described by Laurance . As such, it
is being intuitively ascribed to Congress' increased effort
to compete on a more equitable level with the Executive
Branch regarding debate over the assumptions and force-
design issues surrounding defense policy.
Laurance ' s conception of the systematic character of the
Congressional defense decision-making system is depicted in
Figure 1. /~Ref. 20: p. 222J The discussion which follows
attempts to demonstrate the need for and the potential impact
of a CBO, given a mandate for independent budget and policy
analysis, on the defense decision-making system. By intro-
ducing the nine step-level changes that he associates with
the new 1968-197^ policy system to the indicated systemic
configuration, one can formulate certain generalizations as
to why each of these changes do or do not create a need for
a CBO. Furthermore, one can assess the relevancy for Congres-
sional interaction with the CBO in each of the four key
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For example, one can surmise from the first two changes -
increased legislative coverage of issues, and intensity of
committee debates on defense policy - that Congress was intent
on developing its own sources of information relevant to defense
policy-making. Congress' desire to participate more actively
in the solution of technologically oriented problems presented
by a growing military-industrial complex gave rise to two
requirements. First, the need for increased information inputs
into the policy-making system, and second, the capability
to use this information to appraise, moderate, or alter
executive policy recommendations. Although these first two
changes clearly indicate Congressional willingness to chal-
lenge the executive across a broad spectrum of issues, Congress,
as of 1973. had yet to fully develop a structural capacity
to do so . Thus , the requirement for a CBO is evident at
this point.
The emergence of outside witnesses providing non-DOD
policy alternatives is another indicator of the need and
potential role for a CBO. Laurance presents evidence showing
a significant increase in the magnitude of testimony for
the two Senate military committees during the 1968-1974
policy period. He states, "the increase in non-DOD testimony
is clear evidence of a major attempt to break the executive
monopoly on defense policy alternatives." /~~Ref. 20 t p. 225_7
That this change was apparently institutionalized, supports
the need for creating a CBO to provide expert collateral




The increase in attentive and mass public pressure for cuts
in defense spending did not merely indicate a fundamental
change in public opinion against increased defense expendi-
tures, but, more importantly, provided a source of previously
nonexistent informational inputs to the decision-making
system. Although alternative and adversary public testimony
took place before committees not involved with legislating
defense policy, the resultant publicity indirectly affected
decisions made by the military committees, which operated under
a closed system. If one can equate the influence of non-
defense committee hearings to Congressional desire to obtain
and process more information having relevant implications for
a particular policy issue, then the need for a CBO is
correlative to establishing a comprehensive information search
and processing system.
The first four step-level changes reflect increased
information entering the decision-making system, whereas the
last five describe the altered behavior of the processing
and conversion mechanisms of the system. It is important
to note that changes 5» 8» S-^d 9 focus on the Senate Armed
Services Committee , and indicate a systematic change in the
decision-making model concerning defense authorization
legislation.
The significance of this changed behavior is threefold.
First, while the Armed Services Committee dealt only with
procurement and RDT&E it was having an increasingly important
impact on BOD weapons programs in terms of the changed nature
of its decisions. Contrary to previous behavior in which the
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Committee restricted its decisions to fiscal aspects such
as cost effectiveness and program management, the tendency
now was to consider programmatic aspects involving force
modernization/development and strategic/tactical programs.
Second, the internal conflict within the Committee and its
extensive use of outside witnesses at defense budget hearings
shows a growing reliance on outside opinion sources to supple-
ment the internal staff expertise on defense issues. Third,
the pervasiveness of continuing dissent and balanced views
on key defense issues , coupled with hearings of longer duration
and increased floor debate and amendments, is visibly tied
to a committee effort to strengthen the capability and exper-
tise of its staff to effectively process more inputs
.
The relevance of all this to the establishment of a CBO
is also threefold. First, the creation of a CBO having an
aptitude for policy analysis would provide assistance to the
authorizing committees in terms of facilitating more pro-
grammatic versus fiscal decisions. It would also provide
the mechanism for considering priorities and addressing the
defense/non-defense trade-off dilemma (i.e., whether money
should be moved from health to defense). Second, the CBO
as an alternate source of information input and analysis,
would expand the committee staff capability to process inputs.
Third, CBO's policy alternatives would assist the committees
in the formulation of defense policy and lead to better, more
informed decision-making on defense issues.
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Finally, changes 6 and 7 have no implication for the need
for a CBO as an integrating mechanism, except to serve as
a partial explanation for why the House , during the writing
of the 1974- Budget Reform Act, did not provide for a CBO
at all, seeing no use for policy analysis. Or, in retro-
spect, why there would be conflicting views, subsequent to
its creation, on what the role of the CBO should be.
Having shown why a need arose for a CBO, it is necessary
to review the active development of the organization. Hence,
chapters three and four examine the role, institutional
relationships, and internal structure which demarks the
CBO's activities, and review previous research evaluating
CBO's early performance, respectively.
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III. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE :
A NEW "WATCHDOG" OF CONGRESS
A. CBO'S ROLE IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS
This chapter defines CBO's role and relationships in the
new Congressional "budget process. In addition, it provides
a description of the organizational structure responsible for
carrying out CBO's mandate.
Title II, Section 202 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 /f~Ref . 22J explicitly defines and outlines the functions
and responsibilities of the Congressional Budget Office.
Appendix A to this paper lists the 13 functions of the CBO in
the order in which they are presented in the statute. The CBO
shares these statutory responsibilities with no other Congres-
sional office.
In her opening statement presented before the Senate
Budget Committee in its first CBO oversight hearing since the
passage of the Budget Act, Dr. Alice M. Rivlin , Director of
the Congressional Budget Office, effectively stressed the
essential purpose behind CBO's existence. /~Ref. 23 '• p. ^J
She states, "But I think it is clear that the CBO's main job
is to help you (Congress) make the new budget process work.
If it doesn't do that, it doesn't do anything. It (CBO) is
a new kind of thing on Capitol Hill, and together we must
figure out how to make it work and have it serve the Congress
as well as possible." Dr. Rivlin further elaborates that as
the analytical arm of the new budget structure, the CBO's
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mandate is to provide Congress with an independent and non-
partisan source of analysis and "budget information to help facil-
itate Congressional budget decisions , present alternatives to
major policy choices, and demonstrate the consequences and
implications of adopting various alternative policies. Furter-
more , in performing its functions, the CBO would not work solely
for the Budget Committees, but "be responsible to all committees
and members, in working for the whole of Congress.
More specifically, CBO's role in the new federal budget
process is directly associated with the major efforts by the
Congress to reassert its constitutional authority over the
federal budget. Hence, as previously established in chapter
one, the Congress in 197^ enacted a comprehensive budget
reform measure, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 197^ (Public Law 93-3^) • The Budget Act
provides for Congressional determination on an annual basis
,
the proper level of federal revenues, spending, debt, and the
approximate size of the deficit or surplus, through the process
of enacting two concurrent budget resolutions which essentially
target aggregate budget totals. The Congressional Budget
Office publishes an official document delineating its specific
responsibilities within this Congressional budget process,
from which the following has been extracted. /~Ref . 24s pp.l-3_y'
The Congress develops and passes each Spring, a concurrent
resolution projecting budget targets for the ensuing fiscal
year beginning on October 1st. Subsequent to the first reso-
lution, in September, the Congress takes a look at the detailed
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spending and revenue decisions that have been made through
the passage of individual bills. After a process of debates,
Congress then adopts a second concurrent resolution, recon-
firming or modifying the totals set in the Spring resolution.
The first resolution basically sets budget targets, whereas,
the second puts forth an actual ceiling on spending and a
floor for revenues. Should changing economic and environmental
circumstances warrant some adjustments, the Congress can enact
additional concurrent resolutions.
To implement these procedures, the Budget Act created three
new Congressional institutions; a House Budget Committee, a
Senate Budget Committee, and the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO). The CBO is directed to provide Congress with its own
source of nonpartisan, nonpreferential expertise in the form
of budgetary information and analyses of alternative fiscal
and programmatic policies. The CBO intentionally refrains
from making policy recommendations, staying within its pur-
view of presenting the facts and options for Congress' delibera-
tion and to analyze the possible ramifications of those options
.
CBO's responsibilities specifically encompass: estimates
of the budgetary costs of proposed legislation, projected over
five years; tracking of Congressional budgetary actions with
respect to preestablished targets in the concurrent resolutions
(scorekeeping)
;
periodic forecasts of economic trends and alter-
native fiscal policies; analysis of programmatic issues that
impact on the federal budget; analyses of the effects of
proposed legislation on inflation; and an annual report out-
lining major budgetary options. These primary functions are
further defined below. , Q4o

1. Cost Estimates: Within practical limits, CBO prepares
a five-year cost estimate for the federal government to
implement any public bill or resolution reported by
Congressional committees. Included in these estimates are
projections of new or increased tax expenditures and new
budget authority when applicable. A comparison is made with
any cost estimates computed by Congressional committees
themselves or by federal agencies.
Shortly after the start of each fiscal year, CBO issues
a report projecting federal revenues and spending over the
next five years, assuming continuance of current policies
and programs. These projections provide a baseline against
which Congress can evaluate potential changes as it reviews
the budget for the forthcoming fiscal years.
2. Scorekeeping: CBO tracks or scores individual Congres-
sional appropriation and revenue bills againt the set
targets or ceilings in the concurrent resolutions. Periodic
status reports are issued, showing the cumulative results
of Congressional spending actions to date vis-a-vis the
budget authority and outlay targets. In this report, it
has assumed the duties of the Joint Committee on Reduction
of Federal Expenditures.
3. Fiscal Analysis; Since the federal budget and the
national economy are mutually dependent, the Congress views
the budget in the context of both current and projected
states of the economy. As a means for attaining such an
outlook, CBO prepares periodic analyses and forecasts of
economic trends, and analyses of alternative fiscal policies.
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k. Program Analysis; CBO engages in analyses of program-
matic or policy issues affecting the federal budget. These
reports examine alternative policy choices from a nonpartisan
viewpoint. They cover diverse areas such as agriculture,
energy, housing, hospital and medical costs, defense, state
and local government, employment programs, transportation,
education, budget procedures, international economic policy,
taxation, child nutrition, and programs for reducing govern-
ment spending.
5. Inflation Analysis: CBO is generally charged with
identifying and analyzing inflationary causes. It is
explicitly tasked with preparing estimates of the effects
of major legislative policy proposals on inflation.
6. Annual Report on Budget Options: CBO presents a report
to both the House. and Senate Budget Committees by April 1
of each year, which integrates many of the functional
aspects of the duties mentioned above. This report is
intended to help the two Budget Committees in performing
their task of helping Congress decide on fiscal policy
aggregates (i.e., total spending, revenue, and debt levels),
and national priorities for the next fiscal year. It
discusses alternative budget levels, both in the aggregate,
as well as from a functional category level of detail.
"The CBO annual report and economic forecasts are now
submitted to the Budget Committees in January or
February to be used in preparation for markup of the
first budget resolution." /f~Ref. 25: p. lj
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Congress' inability to set these levels was a major
deficiency prior to the establishment of the new Congres-
sional budget process. £"'.Ref. 25 : p. ij
The CBO will prepare a study or cost estimate at the
request of the chairman or ranking minority member of a full
committee of jurisdiction or the chairman of a subcommittee
of jurisdiction. Priority for those services are established
by the Budget Act in the following sequence: first, the
Budget Committees of the House and Senate; next, the Senate
and House Appropriations Committee, the Senate Finance
Committee, and the House Ways and Means Committee; finally,
all other Congressional committees and Members of Congress.
All Congressional Members receive copies of CBO's published
reports
.
Title III of the Budget Act includes a timetable for
various phases of the Congressional budget process, prescribing
the actions required to take place at each point. Appendix
B outlines the elements of the Congressional budget time-
table as they are set forth in Section 300 of the Act, show-
those specific instances where the CBO interacts with the
new system.
B. CBO-OMB DIVERGENT MANDATES
Before preceding with a discussion of CBO's organization
and staffing, it is advantageous at this point to present an
overview of the President's Office of Management and Budget
(0MB) and highlight several features that distinguish the
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CBO from the OMB. In this manner, perhaps, a reasonable
explanation can be offered as to why the CBO is structurally
organized and manned the way it is.
Regarding the CBO as the Congressional equivalent of
the OMB is a somewhat inexact analogy according to Joel
Havemann. /~~Ref . 26J The fundamental distinction between
the two agencies he stresses, is that "the OMB is a policy-
making institution and the CBO is not." Whereas OMB engages
in policy advocacy in support of presidential preferences,
CBO restricts its activities to providing the Congress with
information and options rather than advice.
OMB's central task, he explains, is to integrate the
spending requirements of all the executive departments and
agencies into a consolidated annual presidential budget.
Major budget issues are subject to final presidential decision,
but the OMB, staffed with about 125 professionals reviewing
the budget, resolves dozens of issues compared to every one
that reaches the President. Once agreement is reached on
policy, the OMB then assumes its role of advocate, primarily
before the Congress
.
Although the CBO must similarly analyze federal spending
programs on an annual basis, the OMB must deal with extensive
detail in developing a single presidential budget proposal.
The CBO, on the other hand, must present Congress with a
number of budget strategies from which to choose, to a signi-
ficantly lesser degree of detail. Hence, a most likely reason
for CBO's staff being considerably smaller than OMB's 625.
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OMB must inherently "be responsive to the policies set
by the President, while the CBO , in the absence of any coherent
Congressional policy to follow, must, of necessity, cater to
all 535 Members of Congress - 100 Senators and 435 Representa-
tives having diverse political views - in proposing satis-
factory policy alternatives. The CBO, therefore, is required
to maintain an impartial, nonpartisan approach to diminish
the chance of client alienation. Lest this occur, the CBO
goes so far as to not even recommend policy, and instead
merely examines the consequences of alternative policy choices
.
Havemann quotes C. William Fischer, one of CBO ' s first
assistant directors, as writing, "CBO is to be neutral on out-
comes, even with regard to cost, but to clearly identify and
illuminate what the implications of alternative actions are,
including the costs." £/.Ref . 27^7
Where the OMB annually prepares a set of budget recommen-
dations for presidential approval, the CBO annually presents
a budget options paper for Congress' consideration. Not
unlike all its other products, CBO's annual report solely
expresses the pros and cons of a wide range of budget choices.
In its exercise of central legislative clearance, the
OMB reviews a majority of Executive Branch policy decisions,
including those having no budgetary consequences. All written
reports and testimony originating from the various executive
departments and agencies, must receive OMB's approval prior
to being presented to Congress. It also reviews all major





Conversely, Havemann concludes, the CBO has duties for
which the 0MB has no comparable task. It must provide Congress
with economic analyses and trend forecasts , similar to what
CEA prepares for the President. Much like the Treasury
Department, CBO analyzes tax policy and prepares estimates of
tax revenue. Contrary to 0MB though, CBO's operations must
be openly observable and readily available to public scrutiny,
as a staff component of Congress. /~~Ref . 28_7
Another way of describing the divergence in CBO's versus
0MB 's operating perspectives, is with an example of the nature
and degree of cooperation that takes place between CBO and 0MB
and other Executive Branch organizations. In responding to
this question before a 1977 House Budget Committee Task Force
hearing on the operations of the CBO, James L. Blum, head of
CBO's Budget Analysis .Division, provided the following des-
cription. "There is a lot of routine conversation at the
staff level between CBO staff and 0MB staff and agency staff.
For example, in unemployment compensation, there is very close
communication between our analysts in this area, the 0MB, and
the Department of Labor analysts . The communication takes
the form of exchanging information about the latest available
data. We discuss the various methodological techniques for
estimating unemployment compensation." /f~Ref. 29 J p. 23J
Mr. Blum further related that CBO and 0MB published entirely
different technical analysis papers with respect to the
5 ;
•A. *•
% specif i<g.^ method used in deriving these estimates. The distinc-
tion between methodologies lay in the types of mathematical
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relationships used to relate the different variables that
affect spending levels. CBO believed their method was better,
although they made a continued effort to improve the model.
Dr. Rivlin, CBO's director, subsequently explained that
the agency's objective was not precisely to reach an agreement
with 0MB 's calculations, but rather that if there should be
a difference of opinion, that the reasons for it are mutually
understood. She went on to point out that one of the prime
areas in which the two agencies differ involves the making
of economic assumptions. The direction in which CBO's and 0MB "s
outlay estimates will differ depends on whether one is a little
more pessimistic or optimistic than the other. Thus, a com-
promise need not be achieved; however, the disparity in
their numbers should be made understood. Moreover, Dr. Rivlin
expressed that for various reasons the CBO has found the
need to go directly to an executive agency to obtain desired
information, but that this was not done behind the OMB's
back as a result of a felt need for independent access to such
information. Rather, it was because 0MB really didn't know
the answer or have the required data. £~\Ref. 29* p. 23_7
One can infer from the above discussion that the CBO, and
therefore the Congress, places considerable reliance upon
executive departments and agencies for basic information
regarding government activities. In essence though, CBO
can make its own independent assumptions apart from OMB's
about the future course and implications of federal programs.
Whether these estimates prove better than those made by the
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Executive Branch remains to be seen. However, at least
the viewpoints taken are now those of Congress, who doesn't
necessarily have to rely on the Executive Branch for policy
initiatives or alternatives. Furthermore, we can attribute
the difference in staffing between CBO and 0MB to the fact
that their jobs differ. Whereas 0MB needs budget examiners
familiar with intricate details of all the programs , CBO
requires analysts that can fashion general options and choices
in less detail.
Figure 2 summarizes CB0-0MB differences along five basic
dimensions - mandate, budget purview, level of detail, loyalty,
and staff size.
C. ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
In a report of the House Commission on Information and
Facilities, on the Organizational Effectiveness of the
Congressional Budget Office, presented in January 1977. the
CBO received high marks regarding the orderliness and clarity
of its organization structure. /~Ref . 30 ! PP • 9-10J The
report concluded that, "Neither CBO's newness nor its obvious
need for staffing flexibility and interdisciplinary analytical
collaboration has been taken as a rationale for organizational
disorder - a common temptation in academic and research
activities." "Indeed its clarity of structure seems to have
contributed to staff communication, coordination, effective-
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Figure 2: Summary of CBO -0MB Differences
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The following description of CBO's organizational structure
and the major functions of its various departments is based
on the most current CBO publication regarding its organization
and duties. /~Ref . ZhJ
The Congressional Budget Office is organized into six
divisions, corresponding to the statutory tasks outlined
in the 197^ Budget Act. Congress establishes CBO's authorized
staffing level annually. Presently, the staff comprises
just over 200 persons, consisting of both professional and
support personnel. The statute specifies only two positions -
that of the Director and Deputy Director.
Appendix C provides a diagram of CBO's organization in
the form of divisional units. The functions of each of these
units are defined below.
Office of the Director, and Deputy Director ?
The Director of the CBO has responsibility for insuring
that all the organization's functions as specified by the
Budget Act are carried out effectively and in a way that
provides most usefulness to Congress. The Deputy Director
assists the Director in managing the organization and
assumes overall responsibility in the Director's absence.
The Director is appointed by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate upon the recommendation of both House and Senate
Budget Committees, to serve a four-year term. The Director
subsequently appoints a Deputy Director.
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Office of the General Counsel ;
The General Counsel oversees legal matters for the CBO
,
including interpreting relevant statutes, analyzing pro-
posed legislation, and reviewing procurement activities.
He also serves as senior advisor regarding policy issues.
Office of Intergovernmental Relations :
The Office of Intergovernmental Relations (OIGR) performs
three functions. First, it acts as the center of communi-
cations with the Congress, state and local governments,
organizations outside government, and the news media. In
this regard, OIGR ensures that information is available
at all times concerning the "budget process in general, and
on CBO's involvement with specific budget issues. OIGR
concurrently supervises the publication of CBO studies.
Second, OIGR's program analysis unit performs studies
related to the budgetary aspects of government-wide organi-
zation, federal workforce employment and compensation,
reorganization within the Executive Branch, and other
government management activities.
Third, OIGR takes care of interal management and
administrative support services for CBO. These duties
involve personnel management, CBO's internal budget pre-
paration, financial management, contracting, library ser-
vices, and office services.
Budget Analysis Division *.
The Budget Analysis Division is responsible for the
major portion of CBO's preparation of cost estimates,
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including the development of five-year federal budget
outlay projections, and scorekeeping. The division also
develops "budgetary terminology as specified in the Budget
Act, assists Congressional committees in evaluating budget
reform proposals, and designs automated budgetary informa-
tion systems.
Fiscal Analysis Division :
The Fiscal Analysis Division prepares analyses of U.S.
economic activity, forecasts of future economic conditions,
and studies of the economic consequences of alternative
economy-related policies or developments. The division
focuses its analyses on such issues as, inflation, employ-
ment, production, incomes, credit, and how these inter-
relate with the federal budget.
Tax Analysis Divisio-n :
The Tax Analysis Division has responsibility for estima-
ting tax revenues, analyzing tax expenditures, and preparing
relevant studies. It performs analysis on the U.S. tax
structure and on proposed alterations to that structure,
emphasizing economic impact, budgetary effects, efficiency,
and distributional ramifications.
Natural Resources and Commerce Division ;
The Natural Resources and Commerce Division analyzes
budgetary issues involving energy, environment, science,
agriculture, transportation, commerce, technology, and
area and regional development. Its studies relate to alter-
native policy objectives, ways of achieving them, and
resultant federal budget costs.
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Human Resources and Community Development Division ?
The Human Resources and Community Development Division
analyzes budgetary issues in the areas of income assis-
tance and social services, education, employment, training,
Veteran's affairs, Community development and housing,
health, and nutrition.
National Security and International Affairs Division :
The National Security and International Affairs
Division prepares studies of "budgetary issues related to
national defense - involving military manpower, strategic
forces, and general purpose forces - and international
economic programs
.
The next chapter looks at the prevailing criticism
surrounding the CBO's handling of policy analysis respon-
sibilities in support of Congressional oversight needs, in
the several years immediately following its creation.
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IV. REALIZED/UNREALIZED EXPECTATIONS ;
CONFLICTING VIEWS ON CBO'S PERFORMANCE
Chapter four attempts to assess the relative impact and
effectiveness of CBO's contribution to the Congressional Bud-
get process, "based principally upon review of available archi-
val evidence . In the course of providing a preliminary
evaluation, it examines where CBO successes have occurred;
reasons why it has not become as influential as perhaps its
director, Dr. Rivlin, has hoped it would be; both early and
more recent perceptions of areas where it has provided the most
utility or made an impact; and comparatively which CBO
activities have received substantial criticism. It empirically
tests the typothesis that different role expectations com-
pelled different assessments of CBO's performance.
Chapter five which follows , endeavors to refine and com-
plete this evaluation or description of CBO's performance
by integrating additional empirical data obtained through
actual interviews of CBO and Congressional committee staff
members regarding their viewpoints on the CBO's role in
the budget process, specifically as it relates to the defense
issue-area.
A. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN PROBLEMS
The professional background of CBO's key division heads
and staff personnel consists mainly of expert economists
recruited from the Office of Management and Budget, other
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Executive Agencies, Brookings Institution, Rand Corp., and
various universities. The inability or unwillingness of
CBO's director, Dr. Rivlin, to fill a greater number of top
staff positions with persons having experience in working
with or for the Congress, had sparked early criticism from
varied outside sources. The House Commission's evaluation
of CBO's organizational effectiveness £~Ref . 30: p. 8_7
,
reflected that Dr. Rivlin' s staffing decision to opt generally
in favor of hiring persons with high ability for policy
analysis, versus Capitol Hill experience, probably presented
an initial disadvantage in dealing with resistance from some
Congressional committee staffers who may have resented any
potential infringement upon their established turf.
Other critics believed that Dr. Rivlin 's recruitment of
staff persons who lacked experience either in Congressional
relations or in budget matters essentially compounded a more
basic organizational error - that of allocating a larger
amount of resources to analyze policy and present alterna-
tives, vice performing a costing and accounting function.
Of the original seven functional divisions created to work
on CBO's products, only two were designed to strictly account
for budget numbers - the budget and tax analysis divisions.
It became apparent, as progress on the fiscal 1976 budget
continued in 1975 » that Dr. Rivlin and her top assistants
had misjudged the effort that would be required to accomplish
what was initially perceived as a routine, secondary role
of the CBO: estimating the costs of spending and revenue
bills, and keeping score on the budget. /"Ref. 31: p. 1431_7
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In an interview with Congressional Quarterly, Dr. Rivlin,
admitted, "We underestimated the workload on "bill costing."
"We've been gradually shifting some people into the costing
and numbers function, and we still need more people there."
'"Ref. 32_7 Constrained, however, by a 193-person ceiling
(vice 259 asked for) imposed by the House Appropriations
Committee on CBO's first budget request in December 1975
>
Dr. Rivlin had to juggle resources from within to accommodate
the added influx of cost estimating demands. These were
borrowed from the policy/program analysis divisions, causing
rivalry and resentment among division staffs
.
Some of CBO's critics responded, according to Smith
Z~Ref . 31_/» by attributing the internal dissension associated
with the shifting of analysts to Dr. Rivlin' s organization
plan which they believed to be basically flawed. They pro-
posed that rather than having policy analysis separated from
budget analysis and cost accounting, these jobs be combined
and aligned to each functional category of the budget, similar
to how the Office of Management and Budget functions. The
same staff in 0MB looks at both cost estimates for health
programs, and long-range policy recommendations for such.
Their justification for joining the two functions rests with
the notion that a programmer doesn't really understand his
objective unless he has current numbers at hand, and likewise,
an estimator requires knowledge of policy implications to




Dr. Rivlin defended her preference for separating these
functions in that the structure made it possible to keep
day-to-day cost estimating activities from interfering with
long-range program analysis. She conceded, although, that
this arrangement posed coordination difficulties and other
disadvantages, intending to monitor the situation closely.
The question remaining in early critic's minds, despite
Dr. Rivlin 's assurance that her system was workable, was
whether the CBO would be able to meet its statutory obligations
effectively under the existing organizational dilemma. The
answer to this will be explored in the succeeding chapter,
where an attempt will be made to reassess CBO's utility and
effectiveness in light of more current evidence regarding the
appropriateness of its staffing pattern.
B. DISSENSION REGARDING CBO'S ROLE
The aura of controversy and misgivings over whether the
CBO should have become more involved with program/policy
analysis has its roots in the debate surrounding the early
drafting of the Budget Act itself. Both Havemann /~Ref . 26:
p. 1256J and Smith /~Ref . 31 ' P • 1^30_7 give comparable
accounts of the difference of intent between the House
and Senate draft versions relating to CBO's responsibilities.
These basic differences, adopted from both writers, are
summarized below.
The House version neglected the concept of a CBO altogether,
and opted for establishing a joint staff supportive of both
the new House and Senate Committees on the Budget. This
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joint staff would do little more than prepare budget
estimates. House members viewed the CBO (i.e., joint staff)
from the stand-point of filling their own needs for a source
of factual, straightforward economic and fiscal data to help
them in drafting legislation on spending.
The Senate, however, viewed the process quite differently,
seeking a CBO that could provide both expert figures on budget
estimates and engage in policy analysis - research on the bene-
fits and costs associated with alternative federal policies.
Senate sponsors chose a "think tank" approach to the agency's
functioning - one that agreed with their broader philosophical
view toward spending and the setting of national priorities.
The issue was deferred to a conference committee session
/~Ref . 22_7, whereupon the House receded from its disagree-
ment with the Senate, thus reaching a compromise solution
in the form of the creation of a CBO with duties entailing
both fiscal and program analysis. Hence, in its role as
counselor to Congress, the CBO was charged with proposing
alternatives to White House programs , as well as , being able
to provide estimates and scorekeeping figures with regard to
Congressional budget actions.
C. COMPARISON WITH OTHER CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AGENCIES
An issue which surfaced repeatedly during early Congres-
sional Budget Office Oversight Hearings conducted by the
Senate and House Budget Committees /~Ref . 23_7, and
/~Ref
. 29 and 33_J7\ respectively, concerned the potentially
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inefficient duplication of effort among the Congressional
Support Agencies. These consist of the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) - the newest member, the Congressional Research
Service (CRS), the General Accounting Office (GAO), and the
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).
A cursory review of each agency's general mission state-
ment, suggests a partial explanation for why these four
"watchdogs" of Congress experience extreme difficulty in
avoiding duplication of effort especially since there appears
to "be considerable leeway for overlap in their services. For
example, the GAO has a mandate of being the government's
auditor for ensuring Executive Branch compliance with Con-
gressional spending decisions, as well as, overseeing the
general operation of programs. The OTA is responsible for
amassing scientific and engineering information and relating
the plus and minus effects of technological applications to
policy issues. The CRS is directed by the 1970 Legislative
Reorganization Act to assist Congressional committees in
evaluating the impact on legislative proposals within their
jurisdiction. As part of the Library of Congress, it also
is tasked with providing a ready reference service in res-
ponding to Congressional requests for information. Finally,
the CBO is required to provide expertise on economic activity
and advice on fiscal implications of Congressional spending
actions - basically, to assist the Congress in implementing




More explicit definitions of the roles and functions of
these agencies may be found in the statutes governing their
establishment. These provide an initial layer of protection
against duplication of functions. For instance, in the case
of the CBO , there is no other agency responsible for pro-
viding cost estimates on pending legislation to the Congress,
as required by sections 308 (a), 308 (b) and 403 of the Budget
Act. A second measure of protection against duplication of
effort is provided in section 201 (e) of the Budget Act
which promulgates the nature of the exchange of information
and resources among the four support agencies. In response
to this legislation, each agency has accordingly prepared
its own set of guiding instructions defining liaison respon-
sibilities and appropriate arrangements to be followed with
respect to cooperation and coordination with its three sister
agencies. /~Ref. Jk\ p. 70_7
Despite these efforts at specifying roles and responsi-
bilities, Ernest S. Griffith put forth in a study prepared for
the Commission on the Operation of the Senate in 1976, that
there are no areas of "exclusive jurisdiction" in the
majority of services rendered by the agencies. /~Ref . 35*
p.-104._7' He further attributes confusion of agency clients
to semantic differences, stating that, "There is ambiguity
among the agencies in their definition of terms." "This
contributes to the problems of misunderstanding of roles on
the part of Congress, and of overlap." He proposed that
the agencies clarify the distinction among the GAO's "audit,"
the CRS's "policy analysis," and the OTA's "assessment" res-
ponsibilities to temper the widened confusion.
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Congressional oversight reaction to these concerns about
wasteful duplication and confusing roles took the form of
a mandate by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees
in 1975, directing the four agencies to establish a research
notification system designed to promote better coordination
and awareness of each other's activities. £~Ref . 33 J Part
II, p. 4_7 Cohen /~Ref . 36-. p. 1W_7 provides a brief
description of the system. He writes, "A blue-covered
manual is issued monthly with weekly updates, listing the
output of all four agencies (projects in progress or completed
within the previous six months). It is distributed only
within the agencies themselves, the Appropriations Committees,
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and the House Govern-
ment Operations Committee. The confidentiality is deemed
essential so that targets will not be tipped off that they
are being investigated."
Cohen describes agency heads ' and Congressional aides
'
attitudes, as a consequence of these safeguards, as believing
that most problems with duplication have been eliminated. He
writes that agencies still concede though to the frequent
occurrence of overlap among their studies. They contend,
however, that a certain amount of overlap can be valuable
in terms of providing a different perspective and reasoning,
and selection of information, behind their reports. Hence,
they provide Congress the needed redundancy and range of
collateral information with which to form their own opinions
and conclusions about an issue. The benefits accruing from
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different agency perspectives regarding complex problems
are demonstrated in Cohen's example of the similar results
of the agencies' assessment of President Carter's synthetic
fuels proposal in 1979- Z~R ef - 36: p. 1484_7 He relates
that Senate Budget Committee task force members agreed, "that
even if the agencies reached similar conclusions from their
different perspectives, the reinforcement would be useful
to the task force."
D. VARYING ASSESSMENTS OF CBO »S IMAGE AND PERFORMANCE
Aside from the criticism regarding the CBO's divisional
setup and internal staffing mix which heavily emphasized policy
analysis vis-a-vis budget analysis, lack of Hill experience
of CBO's analysts, and the potential for unnecessary dupli-
cation of effort already mentioned, Capron £~Ref • 37: p. 84_7
notes yet another negative reaction toward CBO's early per-
formance. This relates to the view that despite CBO's focus
on objectivity and efforts to not play an advocate's role,
it nonetheless had adopted a philosophical position favoring
a liberal slant. Indeed, an early critic was described by
Smith /~Ref
. 31' p. 1^30_/ as having taken the position that
the CBO erred in sticking to the Keynesian premise that,
"increasing the federal budget deficit automatically stimu-
lates the economy." In addition, writes Capron, some had
suggested that the "CBO's purported objectivity is phony:
in selecting alternatives and in describing them, it "loads




Still another negative view of CBO's services was pre-
sented by Havemann /~Ref . 26: p. 1259_7- The CBO had been
remiss in getting its studies out in time to be of any con-
sequence. For example, he writes, "the CBO released their
analysis of welfare reform on July 21, scarcely two weeks
before President Carter announced his welfare proposals." He
continues, "On other occasions, the CBO has analyzed issues
in ways that Congress has not found useful." "A Senate
Budget Committee staff member said a CBO analysis of higher
education programs ignored benefits available under the GI
bill and social security.
Still, Havemann concedes that despite these shortcomings,
CBO's policy studies had generally received high praise from
outside evaluators for their credibility and knowledgeable
content. The only setback, he points out, was that the
CBO had difficulty finding clients for its reports. This
had been explicitly indicated by the House Budget Committee's
reluctance to use CBO's analyses, particularly since it had
never wanted the CBO to do policy analysis in the first
place. The Senate also had shown some initial resistance.
On the other hand, there also existed a clearly dif-
ferent attitude towards CBO's value and potential role
among many critics, regarding other aspects of CBO's efforts
and energies. For example, Capron reports an almost unanimous
agreement among his interviewees as to their impression of
CBO's staff members being extremely competent and talented
with much to offer, given the proper direction. /~~Ref . 37: p. 83_J7
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Additonally, although with some exceptions, the CBO
had "been relatively successful in carrying out the budget
analysis aspect of its mandate. That is, its cost esti-
mates and scorekeeping records had met with widespread
acceptance from Congressional committee staffs that used them.
The House Commission on Information and Facilities awarded
high marks to CBO's "budget estimates in its 1976 study.
£~Re£ . 30; p. 20__7 The results of committee staff responses
to its questionnaire were summarized by Havemann /""Ref . 26:
p. 1258_Z» in the following manner. The ratios indicate
favorable to neutral to negative comments:
1. Scorekeeping: 19 to 3 to 4.
2. Projections of spending and tax bills: 11 to 4 to k.
3. Five-year projections of the entire budget: 10 to 9 to 5
4. Accuracy of projections of authorizing bills: 14 to 3
to 2.
5. Timeliness of projections of authorizing bills: 16 to
2 to 1.
Havemann further reflects that the CBO's budget esti-
mates have occasionally influenced the outcome of a particu-
lar debate. For example, he writes, "the House in 1976
considered a bill (HR 10760) that would have provided federal
pensions for coal miners with 25 or 30 years in the mines.
The Ford Administration, which opposed the bill, estimated
its annual cost at $700 million. The CBO, on the other hand,
estimated it at less than $200 million. The bill eventually
cleared the House (but not the Senate)."
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E. CONGRESSIONAL USE OF POLICY ANALYSIS
An interesting argument that can "be introduced here
is that the value associated with analyses that examine the
uncertainties and complex issues that "beset Congressional
policy formulation, from different points of view, provides
a subtle justification for the existence and usefulness of
a policy-minded agency like the CBO . Griffith reinforce this
notion in his assessment of the glowing evidence supporting
the desire for high-level analysis within the Congressional
membership and committee/subcommittee structure. ,/f~Ref. 35'
pp. 96-97_7 ^e lists several indicators which express the
heightened concern and awareness by Congressional members
of the need for comprehensive policy analyses , "especially
on problems which crosscut the fragmented committee/subcom-
mittee structure." These are:
"1. The desire for parity with the Executive Branch and
with the highly paid specialists representing the lobbyists
or interest groups who seek or oppose given legislation.
2. The desire expressed by some committee members for
a knowledge of alternatives to an existing policy, or at
least as to other means of attaining the same objective.
3. The introduction of the "futurist" time dimension,
or potential crisis identification in considering the
decisions to be made today - i.e., foresight.
4. The American predilection - or genius - for the prag-
matic, nonideological approach to problems which has cut
across committee lines and even the jealousies of
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jurisdictional prerogatives - the realization that com-
plex problems require comprehensive analyses which per-
vade committee lines."
Thus, Griffith takes the view that the potential exists
for Congressional support agencies like the CBO to make
a useful contribution, in cooperation with committee staffs,
as a source of competent information and policy analysis relat-
ing to major complex matters such as military and foreign
policy issues
.
Correspondingly, Norman Beckman points out that "Congress 1
impact on the Executive Branch and on all aspects of policy
determination is pervasive and growing." /~~Ref. 38: p. 238_7
Daniel Dreyfus, a Senate committee staff member, further
relates: "The Congress, itself, is primarily a policy
analysis mechanism in the broad sense. The whole function of
the legislature is to sense the needs of society for policy
initiatives , to define and articulate the options , and to
determine and assert the will of the collective social
decision maker. This, after all, is everything that policy
analysis can encompass." /~~Ref. 39_7
The foregoing discussion is designed to convey the
legitimate differences of opinion expressed by early recipients
and observers of CBO's reports and services, regarding
their usefulness in support of the Congressional budget
process. The data presented clearly indicate that different
perceptions of CBO's role was a major contributing factor
for different interpretations of its value and effectiveness
7^

in equipping Congress to exercise control over the budget
process. Varied assessments of CBO's performance resulted
from several factors: the role projected by CBO's formal
mandate, as written in the 197^ Budget Act; the legislative
history of that act related to initially opposing House and
Senate versions of CBO's functions; and ultimately, diverse
viewpoints of CBO's actual and potential role held by its
Director and staff, committee staffs and Members of Congress,
and outside critics.
It is expected that these initial perceptions of CBO's
role and influence were just that - early observances. Both
the CBO and its committee clients have had the opportunity
over the last five years to develop stronger and clearer
relationships, and to learn and improve over the mistakes
and misunderstandings of the past.
The next chapter attempts to examine and report the cur-
rent evidence that can support the view of such an improve-
ment by the CBO in the relevance and usefulness of its
studies, the disappearance of early resistance expressed
by its clients, and the strengthening of both formal and
informal relations between the committees and the CBO.
The view that the CBO does now substantially contribute
to the ability of Congress and its interacting parts to




V. NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
! — .11 — - — — ' ! ' 111 - I I I '
The data presented in chapter four illustrate the many
different conclusions that have been formed about CBO's per-
formance. In addition, they have demonstrated that, dif-
ferent assumptions and perceptions of the role that the CBO
was to play led to different perceptions of how well they
did perform. What follows is an empirical look at CBO's
impact on the defense policy process.
Through the use of a series of propositions describing
the process model for CBO-Congressional interaction, the
remainder of this research attempts to integrate archival
and interview data, in order to assess the CBO's effective-
ness in defense policy-making. Although the basis for
confirming (or refuting) the majority of these propositions
relies heavily on archival data, the results of interviews
with select CBO staff and Congressional committee staffs
will serve to validate some of the contentions made . The
questions that guided these interviews and a listing of
staff offices contacted are provided in Appendixes D through F.
A. ENHANCED INFORMATION SEARCH AND POLICY APPRAISAL
CBO HAS PROVIDED CONGRESS WITH AN ALTERNATIVE SOURCE
OF INFORMATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS ON DEFENSE ISSUES.
Al. Congress no longer relies heavily on the Executive
Branch as a sole source of defense policy information. Created
by the 197^ Congressional Budget Act to provide the Congress
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with independent, nonpartisan, and objective analysis of
budgetary data and policy alternatives, there is a consensus
of agreement among several writers, (supporters and critics
alike) that the CBO has done a commendable job of providing
Congress with its own source of federal budget information
(see Havemann, 1977; Capron, 1976; Cohen, 1980). Both
Laurance (1976) and Haass (1979) similarly contend and provide
evidence that Congress has undergone a series of legal and
structural changes which have transformed its defense policy-
making process. Associated with this transformation is the
quest for and receipt of more information. When asked,
"What is the most important or useful contribution that
CBO's studies have made to the defense budget process," the
committee staffs responded that CBO has resulted in: "More
data being available to assist Congress in making more informed
decisions .
"
A2. The CBO has enabled the Congress to reassert its
influential budgetary position along side that of the Execu-
tive Branch in the defense policy-making process . Through
consideration and use of the policy analyses conducted by
the CBO, Congress is more capable than before of challenging
the Executive Branch on specific defense programs. The
197^ Budget Act, "created a rudimentary systems analysis
capability, as the CBO staff is capable of producing life-
cycle costs of alternative weapon systems and force pos-
tures" (Haass, 1979: 158-59). The CBO, as an additional input
source, has aided the Congress in its more intense scrutiny
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and evaluation of Administration/DOD proposals and policy
options. It has provided this service primarily through its
thorough, objective analysis of executive recommendations
for the defense "budget (Interview with CBO staff).
A3 . The increased use of the CBO has enhanced the
Congressional defense budgeting process vis-a-vis the emer-
gence and increased consideration of non-DOD policy options
in debate over national defense priorities . This proposi-
tion is supported in part by evidence denoting the number,
requester, and typology of CBO defense-related studies (see
TABLE 1). In addition, the CBO along with other Congres-
sional support agencies and committee staffs have eliminated
the information gap basic to executive dominance in military
issues, and extended Congress' capability to examine Admin-
istration initiated proposals and come up with some of its
own (see Haass, 1979s 151 » 159).
A4. Congress no longer endorses a blank check (i.e.,
"rubber-stamps") for the defense establishment, but rather,
has emerged from its previous reticence with a pronounced
capacity for defining and articulating defense policy
alternatives . Put another way, the CBO has enhanced the
depth and quality of Congress* information search and policy
appraisal through an increased analytical capacity to define
and assess policy options and delineate the consequences
of these choices. The CBO can provide analyses of policy
alternatives with respect to budgetary implications. For
example, their February 1980 paper on the "Costs of the




prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on Research
and Development of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
assesses the long-term costs and other factors associated
with variously configured sea-based strategic forces.
Specifically, it compares the Trident submarine fleet to
other possible submarine/missile combinations and assesses
how each of these choices would affect the costs of develop-
ing, building, and maintaining forces of equal effective-
ness. It also addresses the question of force survivability
and analyzes the implications of various assumptions regarding
survivability at sea for possible changes in the relative
cost-effectiveness of the force options considered. Another
example of the broad perspective and competent analytical
insight of CBO's studies is its January 1980 paper on "Shaping
•the General Purpose Navy of the Eighties." Prepared at the
request of the Senate Budget Committee, this paper focuses
on the "High/Low Mix" dilemma of choosing between a small
number of highly capable, but expensive warships versus
a large number of relatively less capable, but less expen-
sive warships. It looks at this trade-off between "quality"
and "quantity" in view of the possible mission orientations
the Navy might adopt, and presents life-cycle costs and
cost-effectiveness comparisons for naval force options for
fiscal years 1981-1985. Hence, these data indicate that CBO
papers have provided Congress with the kinds of information
necessary to make informed judgments and develop cogent
viewpoints on complex and important defense issues.
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A5« The amount of defense policy-related information
presented to the defense committees by the CBO's National
Security Division has increased over the period 1976-1981 .
The defense committees have increasingly availed themselves
of CBO as an important source of defense policy information.
TABLE 1 presents a listing and typology of defense-related
reports issued by the NSIAD. The data under the "Requester"
column indicate that although the House and Senate Budget
Committees remain the primary requesters of CBO defense
studies, an increasing number of formal requests have
originated from the House and Senate Armed Services Committees
during the 1980-1981 period, followed by the Appropriations
Subcommittees on Defense. This recent trend was corroborated
in an interview with the NSIAD staff who generalized that
the highest proportion of interaction is with the Armed Services
Committee staff, followed by the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittees (in particular the House, although not by its
decision, but rather, directed by its traditional initiation
of the appropriations process), then the Budget Committees.
It is important to note that a lot of this interaction involves
ad hoc or informal queries as an adjunct to formal requests.
A6. Participation of National Security Division analysts
and other high CBO officials in testimony regarding defense
policy issues has obviated previous defense committees'
sole reliance on executive witnesses during hearings. Figure
3 provides an inventory of NSIAD staff member's testimony
before Congressional committees, as an indicator of CBO
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SUMMARY STATISTICS ON TYPOLOGY OF CBO REPORTS
1. StructuralT 14 or 28.0% of total reports.
2. Strategic? 36 or 72.0% of total reports.
3. Within Strategic Issues:
a. Percentage of CBO reports
^
mainly concerned with waste^
and logrolling^ 0.0%
b. Percentage of CBO reports
mainly concerned with
Foreign Policy Goals* 72.0%
4. Within Both Structural and
Strategic Issues:
a. Percentage of CBO reports
acting as a conduit for
defense programs (i.e.,
rubber- stamping) 0.0%
b. Percentage of CBO reports
reflecting development and
appraisal of policy options 84.0%
Structural - refers to defense policy decisions which
deal with the fiscal content of a program in terms
of financial, personnel, material, and organizational
factors. Budget focus is on questions of process
(management, economy, and efficiency).
2Strategic - refers to defense policy decisions which
deal with the relative impact (cause and effect) of
programs or projects on national defense, corresponding
to alternative policy choices. Budget focus is on
programmatic impact on achievement of specific national
security and foreign policy objectives.
3 ...^Waste - spending inefficiencies.
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Logrolling - mutual aid among policy advocates, as "by
reciprocal support for specific programs. The absence
of such in CBO's reports reinforces the apolitical, non-
partisan policy outlook which is CBO's mandate.
^Foreign Policy Goals - detente, peace, security, alliances,
arms control. These goals/objectives relate to current
U.S. military missions, the perceived threat, allied capa-
bilities and assistance , and the implications of this
for U.S. force structuring.
Examples ?
1. Structural (fiscal): CBO's papers on Foreign Military
Sales focus mainly on the economic consequences of for-
eign sales, particularly their secondary effects in
reducing U.S. weapons costs and requirements (i.e.,
financial and material factors)
.
2. Strategic (programmatic): CBO's papers on the U.S. Navy
or strategic versus conventional weapons give the force
options that policymakers can choose from, assumptions
and supportive arguments for each in relation to national
security objectives, and the estimated cost for each
option or mix (i.e., budgetary implications).
Defense-Related Reports:
Breakdown By Requester
HBC SBC HAC SAC HASC SASC OTHER
*
10 30 1 5 3 4
*
Includes 3 concurrent requests by the SFRC/SBC.
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Figure 3' Testimony of NSIAD Staff to Congressional
Committee
Source: Congressional Budget Office
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be noted that the majority of testimony was before the Armed
Services Committees, lending support to proposition A5 • con-
cerning the increase in NSlAD-defense committee relations.
A7. CBO (specifically, NSIAD) has been appropriately
staffed to effectively accomplish its missions as mandated
by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974" If this were to
be true, then one would expect to find an educational/
experience profile of the following composition: l) a high
proportion of staff members holding graduate degrees; 2) a
balanced composition of staff having experience in defense
and other relevant areas such as, economics, foreign and
public policy analysis, government, etc.. Figure k depicts
the educational and career backgrounds of the NSlAD's pro-
fessional staff as of August 13, 1981. These data are
certainly consistent with the expectation of a well-educated,
high calibre staff that is knowledgeable and experienced in
defense affairs. Capron's 1976 study of the CBO reveals a
similar educational composite and draws the same conclusion
regarding the high quality of CBO's (including NSIAD's)
staff members. Concurrent reactions to CBO's staff were
expressed by committee staff members during interviews with
this researcher. There was complete agreement that the
CBO staff members involved in defense issues are of high
calibre. Comments regarding NSIAD' s staffing pattern were
all favorable, in terms of its adequacy to meet the defense
policy analysis needs of the committees . A House Budget
Committee staff member suggested, however, that a realloca-




BA/BS Masters Ph.D. J.D. Other
II. CAREER/DISCIPLINARY BACKGROUNDS
Defense Other
Figure 4s National Security Division Professional Staff
(As of August 13, 1981)
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Analysis Division may be appropriate. This reflects not only
the HBC's focus on budget estimates, but also the House's
earlier views on what role the CBO should play.
B. POTENTIAL UTILITY PROFFERED BY NSIAD STUDIES
THE CBO HAS PROVIDED CONGRESS WITH ADEQUATE ANALYTICAL IN-
DEPENDENCE FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND HAS INFLUENCED
SPECIFIC AND CONTROVERSIAL DEFENSE ISSUES.
Bl . The NSIAD 's policy analyses enable the Congress
to process its own technological, fiscal, and programmatic
information independent of the Executive Branch, in developing
policy alternatives and assessing the broad strategic,
political, and economic implications which these present .
Support for this proposition is evident in the content analysis
of various published CBO budget issue papers and background
studies, as previously characterized in proposition A4. "CBO's
papers on the United States Navy or strategic arms have
indicated the kinds of forces the country can choose, the
arguments on behalf of each, and what each option or mix
would cost" (Haass, 1979: 151)- TABLE 1 illustrates the range
and variety of defense topics in which the NSIAD staff is
engaged. Not included are the ad hoc or informal studies
conducted by the staff in response to committee staffs and
members
.
The House's initial version of the 1974 Budget Reform
Act did not provide for a CBO at all, and instead
established a joint staff for the House and Senate




B2. CBO's and DOD's defense analyses are qualitatively
different; that is, the CBO doesn't reproduce POD defense
analysis, "but rather compiles defense data for its unbiased
analyses . An interview with the NSIAD staff exposed the
following techniques or methodologies used in developing
costing/outlay estimates for different types of defense
programs.
1) NSIAD' s analyses are "basically a critical
review of the services' or DOD's estimates
(i.e., CBO can't unilaterally determine the
cost of, say, the MX-missile ) . . In terms of in-
dependent analysis, it looks at historical cost
data of similar weapons systems; it looks at
inflation figures; sees if the Administration's
data make sense, its estimates are reasonable,
and raises pertinent questions. In areas such
as manpower, however, CBO prepares independent
costing estimates "based on available retention
behavior and payroll data.
2) Services and OSD are key sources of all the
information used to derive such estimates . Much
of this information is provided in the form of
Congressional data sheets (which document spend-
ing levels over 5-year periods), and Systems
Acquisition Reports (SARs). The Defense Manpower
Data Center is another supplier of information.
Ad hoc questions from Members or committees of
Congress are deferred to the services or OSD.
3) With respect to verification of the infor-
mation obtained from a particular source, the
CBO is heavily dependent on the basic honesty of
the services or OSD. Nonetheless, it can look at
external consistencies such as, costs of other
weapons, missiles, or price per pound figures.
It can look at internal consistencies such as,
inflation estimates used in other programs, and
insure that all costs are considered, (e.g.,





B3 • CBO has succeeded in directing Congress' attention
to Defense/Non-Defense trade-offs in deciding among alterna-
tive policy choices. When asked to rank three distinct areas
of CBO's influence, from most value to lease value with res-
pect to defense policy-making, the responses from interviews
generally reflected the following order of importance:
1) CBO's estimates of the "budgetary ramifica-
tions of defense policy alternatives (e.g., cost
estimates and multiyear outlay projections).
2) CBO's assessment of Defense/Non-Defense trade-
offs (e.g., Is a cut in defense spending much
too high a price to pay for a national health
insurance plan?)
3) CBO's analysis of the pros and cons of policy
alternatives
.
These results must "be qualified, however, in terms
of the budgetary orientation of the respondents. For example,
staffers from the Budget Committees and the House Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee gave CBO's cost estimates most
value, reflecting their budget aggregate, cost-cutting focus.
Whereas, a House Armed Services Committee staffer regarded
CBO's cost/benefit analysis of alternatives of most value,
reflecting their policy/programmatic perspective. The data
allow one to conclude that despite its secondary position to
cost estimating activities, CBO's analyses of Defense/Non-
Defense trade-offs merit some consideration and value among
committees. One must temper this view, however, with the





B4. NSIAD 's studies have had a measurable impact on ,
and have been RELEVANT to issues of specific Congressional
interest regarding defense policy . In his 1977 National
Journal article, Havemann wrote, "Making an impact on the
policy-making machinery of Congress has proved more difficult
for the CBO than producing high-grade work." Evidence sug-
gesting that CBO's influence has not "been that negligible
was uncovered however, during this researcher's interviews
with NSIAD and House Armed Services Committee staff members.
Response from the NSIAD staff was cautiously optimistic
toward the usefulness of its studies , professing that in
many limited ways CBO's analyses have caught the attention
of Congressional committees and influenced their actions.
It was accepted that CBO is one of many input sources into
the decision-making process, and it would be unlikely that
the CBO could affect a major proposal like the B-l Bomber,
for instance. On the other hand, it is more easily seen
where CBO's studies have influenced committee staff pro-
posals on pay options. Hence, the NSIAD staff felt that
their studies have had greater impact on more limited legis-
lation by fostering debate on some specific Congressional
action. Three examples cited ares
1) Military Survivor Benefits available through
the retirement system. CBO played an important
role by supplying a good deal of analysis.
2) CBO showed a need in pursuing a mix of con-
ventional and nuclear submarines . This notion
was picked up during debate by the Senate Armed




3) Two years ago, CBO's studies influenced
the "High-Three" debate over major retirement
pay increases. The high-three averaging formula
bases military retirement pay on pay of the last
three years, or average pay over the highest
three years of active service. Congress passed
this law last year, affecting new accessions on
or after September 8, 1980.
B5. The CBO has gotten involved in CONTROVERSIAL or
"messy" issues involving defense policy . Contrary to the
viewpoint expressed in B4. above, a staff member from the
Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee, took a more positive outlook in supporting
the notion that CBO has in fact changed the outcomes of big
issues. His view is based upon the distinction between what
constitutes a big issue as opposed to a small issue. For
example, a major pay issue is the concept of targeting pay
raises to solve the problem of skill specialty shortages.
A minor issue is whether aviation crew incentive p-ay should
be increased by 20 per cent. Given this perspective, he
regarded the recent discussions on the annual military pay
raise as a major issue. He felt there was a high degree of
correlation between what the CBO stated in their study and what
his committee recommended for a pay increase, surrounding
the issue on retention of the All Volunteer Force. Yet
another, totally contradictory position was taken by a Senate
Budget Committee staffer, who related that CBO's policy
analyses have not had a major impact on defense issues con-
sidered by that committee. A larger impact is made by the
Administration, Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries,
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or Senators from states affected by a decision. CBO's policy
studies are influential if they confirm a Senator's report,
or present outlay projections that differ significantly from
DOD's estimates. Consequently, a view reiterated "by a
House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee staffer, was that
CBO's Budget Analysis Division has more of an impact because
it deals with budget numbers. It appears then, from this
and the position taken in B4. , that the determination of
whether the CBO has affected the outcomes of big or contro-
versial issues, depends upon whose definition and perspective
one chooses to observe. In a practical sense, one can only
conclude from the above data that assessment of the true
level of CBO's policy impact is inherently difficult; how-
ever, at this point it is quite safe to say that CBO's
analyses have certainly made a difference in affecting the
outcomes in several limited and specific policy areas.
C. IMPACT ON SYSTEMIC CHARACTER OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE
POLICY SYSTEM
CBO'S ANALYSES HAVE HAD A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE
SYSTEMIC CHARACTER OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.
CI. CBO's policy analyses are a prime factor in Congress
reversing its principal defense outlook from concentrating
on domestic or "structural" issues (e.g., cost-benefit rela-
tionships), toward emphasis on broad "strategic" issues
(e.g., programmatic choices) . Summary statistics on the
typology of CBO defense reports are provided at the end of
TABLE 1. The concepts of "structural" and "strategic" are
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clearly defined and examples of each are provided. The data
indicate that CBO's defense analyses have given more atten-
tion to defining programmatic choices and their associated
budgetary impact, as opposed to focusing entirely on strictly
fiscal or financial, cost-cutting factors. Thus, CBO's
studies have concentrated not so much on waste or spending
inefficiencies, but rather on the range of military force-
structuring options consistent with stated foreign policy
goals and objectives. To the extent that these studies are
increasingly used and cited in debate, the CBO has implicitly
changed the defense policy outlook previously exhibited by
the Congress.
C2. The use of CBO's defense studies has shifted from
primarily the Budget Committees to the military committees .
This proposition was supported by a Senate Budget Committee
staff member who related that at first the committee requested
a lot of policy analysis from CBO, but that the tendency now
is to rely on the GAO (General Accounting Office) for their
budget numbers and cost-cutting reports. The Senate Budget
Committee may ask for three or four policy studies a year,
but is constantly asking for budget numbers on a daily basis.
This trend was also confirmed by CBO's NSIAD staff who
ranked CBO's usage among the various military committees
proportionally higher than the Budget Committees.
C3 • The use of CBO's information and studies by
committees is generally uniform throughout the year. How-
ever, most work is directed towards the budget timetable .
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The general reaction among interviewees was that CBO-
committee staff interaction basically followed a cyclical
pattern which closely paralleled periods of fluctuating
Congressional activity/inactivity. For example, the fre-
quency of staff interaction is heaviest in the Spring (Feb.-
Mar.), gradually subsiding throughout a six month period
preceding committee markups. Interaction tapers off near
the end of Summer, and reaches a minimal level during Nov.-
Jan. when Congress is not in session. While this pattern
is suggestive of close ties to the Congressional budget
calendar, it also conforms to the flexibility enjoyed by the
Armed Services Committees in acting on legislation through-
out the year. Interview responses also suggest that the
committees and CBO share similar views on the budget process.
The timing of CBO's studies is matched to deadlines for con-
sideration of budget legislation by Congress.
C4. Committee views on their use of CBO's analyses
are balanced between that of an extension of their own staff ,
or as just one of the service agency resources they can use .
Whereas a dichotomy in House and Senate committee views was
readily apparent in the early years following CBO's creation,
i.e., the Senate looked upon the CBO as an extension of its
own Staff; the House perceived it as just another service
agency (see Gregg, 197^-s 265^) » this division is now cer-
tainly less distinct. Response from interviews conducted
with committee staffs clearly indicates a more balanced
attitude towards the extent of CBO-committee ties.
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C5 • CBO's studies have most importantly contributed
to the defense "budget process "by having more data available
to assist Congress in making more informed decisions . Given
that more data is available (see propositions A and B) , it
has had the following effect on the system. More budget alter-
natives have changed Congressional behavior on defense issues
by providing the opportunity to consider policy options in
a more rational manner. This reaction was common to all
staff members interviewed and was ranked first, followed
closely by: "more alternatives are made available to Con-
gress," and "budget decisions are made through a more
rational process," in that order.
C6. CBO does not generally duplicate the work of other
Congressional Support Agencies and where subject overlap
has occurred, the results have materially benefited the
defense budget process . The CBO is one of four staff
agencies providing a range of information inputs designed to
enable Congress to break away from executive dominance in
policy formulation and program oversight. To the extent that
CBO's projects overlap with those of its sister agencies,
the leaders of these agencies maintain that direct benefits
accrue from some redundancy. Among these are that collateral
sources of information fosters security, more studies
increases the chances of analysis matching a given opinion,
and conflicting or incomplete views may heighten understand-
ing of an issue's complexity (see Cohen, 1979: 1484).
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C7 . CBO has had relatively more potential influence
over defense than any other issue . Support for this
proposition stems partially from the fact that defense
expenditures are part of the 25 to 30 percent of the
federal "budget that Congress exercises relative control
over (see chapter two, section A). Congress is apt to exert
its "budget influence over "controllable" issues in the
defense area, rather than intervene legislatively over
"uncontrollable" issues such as, mandatory entitlements.
Thus, CBO's potential impact is likely to conform to
this focus. Furthermore, Congress has significantly
increased its scrutiny and influence over the defense
"budgeting process to where it now must approve or authorize
nearly three-fourths of all defense requests. This
includes weapons systems R&D and procurement, military
construction, O&M funds, and conceivably military pay
and personnel at a later date (see Laurance, 1976$ 219
and Haass, 1979s 158)- Congressional committee requests
for CBO policy studies on defense can be correlated
to this effort to increase Congress ' capacity to affect
defense budgets. TABLES 2, 3» and 4 provide a compar-
ative analysis of CBO's potential policy impact or
influence in terms of a breakdown by year, category,
and number of reports it has published. This review encom-
passes some 258 unclassified reports issued by CBO from
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CBO's defense-related studies and reports in other major
policy areas (TABLE 2), defense-related versus domestic
policy reports (TABLE 3), and finally, comparative budgets
and CBO report emphasis (TABLE 4). There is a positive
correlation between the percentage of CBO reports on defense
issues (TABLE 3) and the percentage of the federal budget
which defense occupies. Similarly, CBO defense-related
reports constitute a larger proportion of total reports than
any other single issue
.
Summary! The three sets of propositions (A,B, and C)
enumerated above, define the process model for CBO-committee
relations and address both the actual and potential impact
of CBO's policy studies on the Congressional defense decision-
making system. Specifically, with respect to the attempt
to confirm the hypothesis that, "CBO's analyses have sub-
stantially influenced the Congressional decision-making pro-
cess regarding defense policy issues , " it would be very
difficult to conclude objectively whether a significant
level of policy impact has occurred. Sufficient evidence
exists, however, that indicates a definite growth in CBO's
influence. This upward trend is observed with respect to some
particular defense issues such as, manpower and compensation
and more frequent staff contacts, better relationships,
and increased use of CBO's studies by the military committees.
In relation to the hypothesis that, "CBO has had more impact
on defense issues than on any other issues involving Con-
gressional policy debate," analysis of data available
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permitted only limited progress in achieving a rigorous test
of this claim. The data show a greater number of defense
reports issued compared to domestic policy studies, and
reveal a direct relationship between the high level of defense
spending and a corresponding level of CBO defense studies.
However, further analysis is necessary to assess the relative
impact on outcomes between defense and domestic issues
that CBO's analyses have had.
Chapter six places the foregoing analysis of chapters two
through five into thorough perspective by presenting a-
summary of principal findings and conclusions.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. RESTATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
This research was directed principally towards an assess-
ment of the relative impact which CBO's policy analyses have
had on the Congressional defense decision-making process.
Concurrent with this effort was the need to clarify the
underlying oasis for the legitimate differences in view-
point regarding CBO's performance and effectiveness among
early internal and external observers of CBO's activities.
The emphasis of this investigation has been to develop insights
and perceptions surrounding CBO-Committee interrelations,
in order to achieve a heightened understanding of the
importance of CBO's role and client relationships. In this
manner, inferences were able to be drawn regarding CBO's
contribution toward eliminating some of the structural and
procedural deficiencies associated with the traditional
legislative budgetary machinery.
A new organization for a new procedure, the CBO was
created to assist Congress in understanding the budget
and implications of budget decisions, so that it could make
better decisions. How well it has performed its mandate,
particularly related to its impact in the defense policy area,
has been the focus of this thesis. A brief summary of the
analysis contained in the preceding chapters , and an
enumeration of principal findings follows.
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B. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The need for the creation of a CBO grew fundamentally out
of two equally transcending changes in the Congressional
policy-making system related to control over the federal
budget and national priorities. The first, largely in
relation to government spending and fiscal policy objectives,
had to do with executive-legislative conflict which escalated
to the point where Congress needed to react to what appeared
to be a usurpation of its budget prerogatives by the presi-
dency. The second relates to the defense policy process
wherein the need for a CBO was based on changes in the Con-
gressional defense policy system which occurred in the late
60 's - early 70' s. The demand for more technical analysis
and information independent of the executive arising out of
complex issues such as the ABM debate, legitimized the need
for a mechanism (in the form of a CBO) that would expand
the limited sources of specialized, technical expertise
and budget-related data available to the Congress.
Hence, the CBO emerged out of a general mood that was
ripe for instituting budget reform. Given this potential
for having an impact on the policy-making process of Con-
gress, a closer look was necessary to determine how CBO's
policy analyses were actually used.
In assessing whether the CBO has played a significant
role in strengthening Congressional involvement in defense
policy matters, a range of organizational dimensions relevant
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to appraising CBO's performance were examined. These
consisted of: statutory functions, organizational struc-
ture, staffing, similarities/dissimilarities with 0MB,
and comparison with other support agencies.
Conflicting assessments of CBO's performance were found
to "be a result of differences of opinion regarding CBO's
appropriate role and external relationships, out moreover,
these varying perceptions are associated with the specific,
"budget orientation and needs of the various Congressional
clients it serves. Finally, an empirical examination is
undertaken of CBO's actual and potential impact in terms
of a set of propositions which define the process model for
CBO-Committee interaction vis-a-vis the Congressional defense
decision-making system.
A compilation of significant findings related to the
inventory of propositions (A, B, and C) presented in chapter
five is provided below:
1. CBO's studies have been relevant to specific
Congressional needs and have materially contributed in making
more data available to assist Congress in arriving at better
informed decisions.
2. One of many inputs into the budget process,
the CBO has aided the Congress in exercising greater scrutiny
and evaluation of Administration/DOD policy and budget
recommendations. It has provided competent and objective
analysis of policy alternatives and associated budgetary
implications on complex defense issues.
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3. Use of CBO's defense policy studies has gradually
shifted from predominantly the House and Senate Budget
Committees, to more frequent requests and interaction from
the Armed Services Committees.
4. CBO's policy analyses are generally regarded
"by committee staffers as being knowledgeable , high-grade,
analytically sound, robust, unbiased, and complete. Cor-
respondingly, its National Security and International Affairs
Division is staffed with highly capable personnel, who are
knowledgeable and experienced in defense affairs.
5. CBO doesn't necessarily design new options; for
the most part, it just analyzes them. NSIAD's analyses are
essentially a critical review of the services' or DOD's
figures/proposals. However, it can make different assump-
tions and validate the data and analysis underlying those
estimates, independent of the executive.
6. CBO's policy analyses do occasionally influence
key or controversial decisions on important defense issues.
On a limited scale, CBO's analyses of options have influenced
"narrower" defense topics, nonetheless having considerably
broad policy implications. Prominent examples have been
the military pay raise, survivor benefits, "high-three"
retirement annuity averaging formula, and "high/low" weapons
systems mix issues.
7. CBO's defense analyses are more apt to affect
the outcome of small decisions that may (or may not) contri-
bute to the outcome of big issues. Its policy studies have
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had more effect on soft, less technical issues such as
manpower and compensation versus hard, highly technical
R&D and procurement decisions.
8. CBO's analyses and testimony have rarely entered
full or subcommittee debate, but rather their use and atten-
dant interaction occurs more frequently at the committee
staff level. To the extent its studies are cited, CBO's
views, during committee discussion in markup, may hold
less weight than committee staff reports, since committees
have their own investigative and survey staffs on specific
programs.
9. The budget impact of CBO's analyses in terms of
outlay projections, focus on overall trends in budget levels,
and cost-cutting alternatives , is much greater than the
impact of its policy analysis on force structure decisions
for any specific defense program. This reaction stems from
the differential budget orientation and needs among the
committees that review CBO's studies. Thus, the Budget
Committees and Defense Appropriations Subcommittees are more
interested in how much should the MX-missile cost, and not
whether we should have one. Still, CBO's analyses have
given considerable attention to programmatic choices, in
most cases projecting cost estimates primarily for comparative
purposes.
10. Closer ties, both formal and informal, have developed
regarding CBO-committee staff coordination and collaboration.
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Interaction at the staff level is regular and generally
uniform throughout the year, however, most work is directed
toward the budget timetable. CBO has also established
stronger coordination with its companion support agencies,
dispelling any visible committee concern over waste and
redundancy.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following areas are deemed appropriate for further
investigation, as they relate to efforts to more accurately
assess the impact of CBO's policy analyses on the Congres-
sional decision-making system.
1. An indepth look at whether the CBO has reversed
the predominantly negative image of the Congress as being
nonrational, splintered, basically crisis oriented, and
"political" in its policy decisions.
2. A more vigorous assessment of the contention that
CBO has exercised more influence over defense issues vis-a-vis
domestic issues involving Congressional policy debate.
Although the data examined in this research indicate that
CBO defense-related reports constitute a larger proportion
of total reports published than any other single issue,
further investigation is warranted to reveal the comparative
impact of CBO's analyses on domestic issues.
3. No discernible evidence was obtained that would
prove or disprove the existence of CBO - committee staff
rivalry regarding the scope and quality of their respective
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policy analyses. The role attributed to CBO's policy
analysis is to lay out the relevant issues and try to
distinguish them. Committee staff analysis differs from
CBO's in that they generally support a position that is
already decided on, trying to get a consensus or influence
the boss' position. Some conflict necessarily arises con-
cerning whose option should be supported. An interesting
revelation would be how efforts to subdue any destructive




APPENDIX A j STATUTORY TASKS ASSIGNED TO CBO
CBO's statutory tasks are listed here in the order in
which they appear in the Congressional Budget and Impound-
ment Control Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-344) • Citations
are to the U.S. Code and, in parentheses, to section num-
bers of Public Law 93-344.
(1) In general, provide information to the two Budget
Committees on all matters within their jurisdiction,
2 USC 602(a), (202(a)).
(2) On request, provide information to the appropriating
and taxing committees, 2 USC 602(b), (202(b)).
(3) On request of any other committee, provide information
compiled under (l) and (2) plus, "to the extent practica-
ble," additional information that may be requested, 2 USC
602(c)(1), (202(c)(1)).
(4) On request of a Member, provide information compiled
under (l) and (2) plus "to the extent available," addi-
tional information, that may be requested, 2 USC 602(c)(2),
(202(c)(2)).
(5) Perform the duties and functions formerly performed
by the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expendi-
tures, 2 USC 602(e), (202(e)), see also 31 USC 571.
(6) Annually on or before April 1, furnish to the Budget
Committees a report on fiscal policy for the next fiscal
year, to include a discussion of alternative levels of
revenues, budget authority, outlays, and tax expenditures,
plus alternative allocations among major programs and
functional categories, all in the light of major national
needs and the effect on "balanced growth and develop-
ment in the United States," 2 USC 602(f)(1), (202(f)(1)).
(7) Prom time to time, furnish the Budget Committees such
further reports as "may be necessary or appropriate,"
2 USC 602(f)(2), (202(f)(2)).
(8) Develop and maintain filing, coding, and indexing
systems for all information obtained by CBO from the
Executive Branch or from other agencies of the Congress, -
2 USC 603(b), (203(b)).
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(9) With respect to each committee bill providing
new budget authority, furnish to the reporting committee
for its consideration: (a) a comparison of the bill
with the most recent concurrent resolution on the bud-
get, (b) a five-year projection of outlays associated
with the bill, and (c) the amount of new budget authority
and resulting outlays provided by the bill for state
and local governments, 31 USC 1329(a)(1), 308(a)(1)).
(10) With respect to each committee bill providing new or
increased tax expenditures, furnish to the reporting
committee for its consideration: (a) a report on how
the bill will affect the levels of tax expenditures
most recently detailed in a concurrent resolution on the
budget, and (b) a five-year projection of the tax ex-
penditures resulting from the bill, 31 USC 1329(a)(2),
(308(a)(2)).
(11) Periodically, issue a scorekeeping report on the
results of Congressional actions compared with the most
recently adopted concurrent resolution on the budget,
plus status reports on all bills providing new budget
authority or changing revenues or the public debt limit,
plus up-to-date estimates of revenues and the public
debt, 31 USC 1329(b), (308(b)).
(12) Annually, "as soon as practicable after the begin-
ning of each fiscal year," issue a five-year projection
of budget authority and outlays , revenues and tax ex-
penditures, plus the projected surplus or deficit, year
by year, 31 USC 1329(c), (308(c)).
(13) Prepare "to the extent practicable" a five-year cost
estimate for carrying out any public bill or resolution
reported by any committee (except the two appropriating
committees), 31 USC 1353. (403).
(14) Study jointly with the Office of Management and
Budget, but report separately, on the feasibility and
advisability of year-ahead budgeting and appropriating,
the report to be made by February 24, 1977. 31 USC
1020 note, (502(c)). (The report was submitted on that
date)
.
(15) Cooperate with the Comptroller General in development
.of standard. fiscal terminology, 31 USC 1152(a)(1), (801(a))
(Sec xs 202(a) (1) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
(16) Cooperate with the Comptroller General in develop-
ing, an inventory of fiscal information sources, providing
assistance to the Congress m obtaining information from
those sources, and furnishing, on request, assistance
in appraising and analyzing information so obtained, 31
USC 1153(b), (801(a)), (Sec. 203(b) of the Legislative




(17) With the Comptroller General, establish a central
file or files "of the data and information required to
carry out the purposes of this title," 31 USC 1153(c), (801
(a)), (Sec. 203(c) of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1970)
.
(18) Cooperate with the Office of Management and Budget
in providing useful federal fiscal information to
state and local governments, 31 USC 1153(d), (801(a)),
(Sec. 203(d) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970).
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Responsibilities
and Organization, pp. 11-13. Fall 1980.
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APPENDIX B: CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET DEADLINES
October-December : Congressional Budget Office submits
five-year projection of current spending as soon as possible
after Oct. 1.
November 10 ; President submits current services budget.
December 31 ' Joint Economic Committee reports analysis
of current services budget to budget committees.
Late January ; President submits budget (15 days after
Congress convenes)
.
Late January-March ; Budget committees hold hearings
and begin work on first budget resolution.
March 15
s
All legislative committees submit estimates and
views to budget committees.
April 1; CBO provides a report to the two Budget
Committees on fiscal policy and national priorities for
the next fiscal year.
2
April 15 s Budget committees report first resolution.
May 15 '. Committees must report authorization bills
by this date
.
May 15 '• Congress completes action on first resolution.
Before adoption of the first resolution, neither house may
consider new budget authority or spending authority bills,
revenue changes, or debt limit changes.
May 15 through the 7th day after Labor Day; Congress
completes action on all budget and spending authority bills.
- Before reporting first regular appropriations bill,
the House Appropriations Committee, "to extent practicable,"
marks up all regular appropriations bills and submits a
summary report to House, comparing proposed outlays and
budget authority levels with first resolution targets.
- CBO issues periodic scorekeeping reports comparing
congressional action with first resolution.
- Reports on new budget authority and tax expenditure




- "As possible," a CBO cost analysis and five-year
projection will accompany all reported public bills, except
appropriation bills.
August: Budget committees prepare second budget
resolution and report.
September 15 - Congress completes action on second
resolution. Thereafter, neither house may consider any bill
or amendment, or conference report, that results in an
increase over outlay or budget authority figures, or a
reduction in revenues, beyond the amounts in the second
resolution.
September 25 ; Congress completes action on reconcilia-
tion bill or another resolution. Congress may not adjourn
until it completes action on the second resolution and
reconciliation measure, if any.
October 1: Fiscal year begins.
"By agreement between the Budget Committees, Appro-
priations Committees, and 0MB, the current services
budget is now submitted in January in the President's
Special Analyses of the Budget." /~Ref. 27 : p . Q_7
The CBO annual report and economic forecasts are now
submitted to the Budget Committee in January or
February to be used in preparation for markup of the
first budget resolution." /Ref. 27: p. 1
J
Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Congressional
Budget Control: New Budget System Survives
First Year Intact
, p. 918, 1975-
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APPENDIX D: QUESTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE STAFFS
la. Have CBO's formal products had a direct, identifiable
impact on "outcomes"? Can you elaborate on specific reports
and their impact on Congressional defense budget decisions?
b. How frequently are the results of CBO studies entered
into Congressional debate over a particular defense issue?
c. Is testimony by CBO members regarding their defense
studies most likely to take place before Congressional
committee staffs, or committee members? Before committee
markups, or floor debate? Does such testimony play a
major part in influencing a committee position or ultimate
policy decision?
d. In describing CBO's impact on defense policy-making,
would you say that CBO has categorically changed the out-
comes of big issues, or rather, that it has influenced
smaller decisions that inevitably impact on larger ones?
2. Which of the following would best describe your
committee's usage of CBO's analyses?
a. A supplement to the committee's own studies and
budget estimates.
b. An extension of its own analytical staff resources.
c. Just another service agency, whose studies and
estimates are used as a basis for the committee's own
analyses
.
3. The scope of CBO's policy analyses can be measured in
terms of three distinct areas of influence. These are:
a. CBO's analysis of the pros and cons of policy
alternatives
,
b. CBO's assessment of Defense/Nondefense trade-offs
(e.g., Is a cut in defense spending much too high a price to
pay for a national health insurance plan?), and
c. CBO's estimates of the budgetary ramifications of




Can you rank these from most value to least value with
respect to defense policy-making?
4. Among the following, what would you consider to be the
most important or useful contribution that CBO's studies
have made to the defense budget process?
a.' The decision process is made longer.
b. Budget decisions are made through a more rational
process
.
c. More alternatives are made available to Congress.
d. More data are available to assist Congress in
making more informed decisions.
e. Any other supportive dimension?
5. Who uses CBO's defense policy analyses the most -
committee staffers or committee members?
6. Qualitatively, in what way have CBO reports impressed
you? (e.g., objective, credible, knowledgeable, high-
grade, unbiased, etc.)
7. What is your impression of the CBO staff - Committee
staff relationship in terms of the following dimensions?
a. Respect for each other (mutual : insensitive)
b. Frequency of interaction (regular : infrequent)
c. Communicative style (formal : informal)
d. Degree of collaboration (close : restrained)
8a. With respect to degree of interaction, is the use of
CBO's information and studies by committees tied to the
budget timetable , or is it uniform throughout the year?
b. Proportionally, how would you divide CBO's usage
among the various military committees?
c. Do you feel that the staffing pattern within the
National Security and International Affairs Division of
CBO is adequate to meet the defense policy analysis needs
of the military committees? If not, how can it be improved?
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9. Do you think the CBO has really fulfilled its man-
date of "being impartial, and do you think that it will con-
tinue to do so in the future? Will the impatience of
Memoers of Congress that seek definitive guidance on
which "budget option to support eventually cause the CBO
to change its approach?
10. In terms of the utility and impact of CBO's products,
have you seen a change over the years?
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APPENDIX E: QUESTIONS FOR CBO (NSIAD) STAFF MEMBER
1. Who uses CBO's defense policy analyses the most -
committee staffers or committee members?
2a. Does interaction with these committees occur on a year
around "basis, or does CBO liaison with committees correspond
to specific events within the "budget cycle/timetable?
(e.g., BC's April 15 report on 1st concurrent resolution,
or ASC's May 15 authorization "bill deadline).
b. If the former is the case, within a given week, in what
proportion would you say NSIAD delt with the Budget Committees,
Appropriations Defense Subcommittees, and Armed Services
Committees?
3. Do you perceive an element of rivalry "between the CBO
and Congressional committee staffs regarding the quality
of your respective policy analyses?
4. Does the NSIAD have a strategy of its own for influ-
encing Congressional committees? For example, do you
coordinate early and regularly in your preparation of
studies, with the committees?
5a. Does the NSIAD sometimes find it difficult to remain
or appear impartial in its studies?
b. What happens when a particular policy alternative, as
analyzed by the CBO, appears to be more attractive than
others?
6. What has l^een the reaction from Members of Congress
concerning CBO reports that make no recommendation as to
what budget option to support? Impatient? Indifferent?
7a. What techniques or methodologies does the NSIAD
use to develop costing/outlay estimates for different types
of defense programs?
b. What is the source of all the information used to
derive such estimates?
c. What methods are used to verify or insure validity
of the information obtained from a particular source?
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8. Does NSIAD collaborate internally with other CBO divi-
sions regarding its studies? What is the nature of this
interaction? (e.g., cost estimates?)
9. To what extent does NSIAD coordinate or collaborate
with outside agencies and private consultants in develop-
ment of its studies?
10. What is your outlook on NSIAD * s effect on defense issues
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